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EASTERN

F.O. 371

1947

PALESTINE

FILE NO. 951

pp. 11127 - 11275

GLOSED JUNTIL 1378

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11128

Next Paper.

30471 F.O.P

En Clair

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3527

D. 11.10 a.m. 25th Nevember 1947

R. 4.50 p.m. 25th Nevember 1947

25th Nevember 1947

Repeated to Jerusalem
Washington (Saving) 1127

GIANT

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram We NG 127 of 25th Nevember repeated for information to Jerusalem and saving to Washington.

My telegram Ne. 3513.

Palestine.

Representatives of Soviet Union, Egypt and Guatemala spoke at yesterday morning's meeting of ad hoc Committee.

2. Seviet delegate claimed that there was inconsistency in the various statements made by representatives of United Kingdom but that if these were analysed only one conclusion could be drawn from the reservations and warnings of intermedine war which they contained, from categorical refusal to bear any responsibility for the new regime, from desire to evacuate troops and refusal to cooperate with United Nations authority: this conclusion was that United Kingdom had decided to work against decision of United Nations and, in refusing to cooperate except in event of Arab-Jewish agreement, were deliberately providing a loophole for those who wished to oppose a settlement by means of such decision. If United Kingdom had not intended to assist in a United Nations solution there was no need for her to have referred matter to United Nations. But fact was that British Government had applied to United Nations for a recommendation and new after a lapse of time made reservations which deprived this application of all meaning. The statements of United Kingdom were incompatible with obligations she had assumed as mandatory. As regards legal basis of recommendations of sub-Committee 1 the Soviet delegation was satisfied that Article 10 of Charter provided all that was necessary.

3. Egyptian delegation made two statements. In the first Heykal Pasha gave a warning that partition would lead to shedding of Arab blood in Palestine and that it would then be impossible for Governments of Middle East to prevent infuriated mobs from taking reprisals on the large Jewish communities resident in their countries. A flame of anti-Semitism would be lit which it would be no more possible for Arab Governments to extinguish than it has been possible for Great Britain to stop terrorism in Palestine or United States Government to stop lynching in America.

/ In....

A MARINE

In the second statement Mahmoud Fauzi criticised sub-Committee 1 for everlooking legal objections to their plan, challenged assertion of Seviet Union that plan was based on principle of self determination and finally described it as one designed to facilitate establishment of military bases in Middle East under guise of carrying out wishes of United Nations: the thomands of "Zionists of uncertain origin" now waiting in Black Sea ports were the future fifth columnists in this design.

4. Speech of representative of Guatemala was confined to two points (a) drawing attention to inconsistency in attitudes of delegates of Syria and Egypt towards reference of this problem and those of Sudan and Indonesia to the International Court and

(b) centesting that there was no substance in objections of New Zealand delegate, since plan of sub-Committee 1 made provision for adequate means of implementation provided that mandatory Power did not place obstacles in way of formation of militia and of provisional councils. If there was obstruction and plan failed then United Kingdom would bear the responsibility.

Please pass Jerusalem as my telegram No. 234.

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section, Colonial Office for retransmission to Jerusalem]

666

30471 F.O.P

11129

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En Clair.

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)
Sir A. Cadegan
No. 3528
D: 11.27 a.m. 25th November, 1947
25th November, 1947.

R: 4.50 p.m. 25th Nevember, 1947.

Repeated to Jerusalem

Washington Saving.

.1128

GIANT.

20 NOV

Addressed Fereign Office telegram Ne. 5528 of 25th Nevember repeated Jerusalem and Saving Washington.

Palestine.

Following amendments to part one of report of Sub Committee one were adopted by ad hoc Committee last night.

- (1) Section B 1 to read as follows "a commission shall be set up consisting of representatives of five member states. The members of the Commission shall be elected by the assembly on as broad a basis, geographically and otherwise, as possible" (proposed by Norway and Pakistam).
- (2) Section B.3. Amended as proposed by Netherlands (see my telegram No. 222 to Jerusalem).
- (3) Section C Chapter 1 Paragraph 2 to read as follows "in so far as the hely places are concerned, the liberty of access visit and transit shall be guaranteed in conformity with existing rights to all representatives and citizens of the other state and of the city of Jerusalem, as well as to aliens, without distinction as to nationality, subject to requirements of national security, public order and decorum.

Similarly freedom of worship shall be guaranteed in conformity with existing rights subject to the maintenance of public order and decorum" (proposed by France).

4. Fellowing sentence added to paragraph 4 of Chapter 1 of Section C "no change in the incidence of such taxation shall be made which would either discriminate between the owners or occupiers of hely places, religious buildings or sites, or would place such owners or occupiers in a position less favourable in relation to the general incidence of taxation than existed at the time of the adoption of the assembly's recommendations" (proposed by Australia).

AN IN C

Please pass Jerusalem as my telegram Ne. 235.

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office for retransmission to Jerusalem].

AAAA

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*MATERIA

371/6189

/61890

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Cypher/OTP

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No.3532 25th November, 1947.

D. 6.37 p.m. 25th November, 1947

R. 11.52 p.m. 25th November, 1947

Repeated to Jerusalem and Saving to Washington. MOST IMMEDIATE

GIANT SECRET

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.3532 of 25th November, 1947 repeated to Jerusalem and Saving to Washington.

Palestine.

The debate in the Ad Hoc Committee ended on the afternoon of the 25th November with a vote on the partition proposal of Sub-Committee One. This received 25 affirmative votes with 13 against and 17 abstentions, thus falling short by one vote of the two-thirds majority which will be required in the plenary.

- 2. It is generally believed that some of the delegates who abstained in committee will vote for partition in the Assembly. On the other hand Feisal told Beeley after today's vote that the Philippine, Liberian and Greek delegates were deliberately lying low at this stage in order to avoid pressure, but had promised their votes to the Arabs in the Plenary.
- 3. Feisal also said that in his view the decision in favour of partition would be as dangerous for British as for Arab interests. He therefore appealed to the British delegation to depart from its attitude of neutrality and use its influence in the lobbies. Beeley held out no hope of such a change of attitude, but promised to report Feisal's plea.
- 4. With reference to Washington telegram No.6631 there are indications that American pressure on other delegations has diminished.

Foreign Office please pass Immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram No.237.

[Copy sent to Colonial Office for transmission to Jeruselem].

ra nsmi

MARGIN. BE 0 NOTHING Registry

B. A. B. B.

Telegram.

No. 4104

Dated 7.5. 26

Repeat to:

Jerusalem

Washington /2205

Cypher

World Organisation

SECRET

Addressed to U.K. Delegation, New ter No 4104 Nov 20 th Information

York. A Repeated to Jerusalem and Washington.

Your telegram No. 3532 [of 25th November: Palestine].

The Delegation should not depart from an attitude of neutrality and no attempt should be made to influence voting of other Delegations.

61890

OUT FILE

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

Cypher/OTP

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK

(To United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 1104. November 26th, 1947. D. 5.58.p.m. November 26th, 1947.

Repeated to Jerusalem
Washington No. 12205.

MOST IMMEDIATE.


SECRET.

Addressed to United Kingdom Delegation, New York telegram No. 4104 November 26th repeated for information to Jerusalem and Washington.

Your telegram No. 3532 [of 25th November: Palestine.]

The Delegation should not depart from an attitude of neutrality and no attempt should be made to influence voting of other Delegations.

66666



[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

Cypher/OTP

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET) 130

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE (From United Kingdom Delegation to United Willys)

No.3539 25th November, 1947 D.12.00 mdt. 26th November, 1947 R. 6.00 a.m. 26th November, 1947

Repeated to Jerusalem and Washington.

MOST IMMEDIATE

LIGHT

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.3539 25th

November repeated to Jerusalem and Washington.

Following for Secretary of State from Minister of State.

Palestine.

11040/91-1

I took your telegram No.4077 to mean that you approved the idea of United Kingdom Delegation making a statement in plenary session. If it were made it would presumably cover the following points:

- (1) We cannot allow the debate in the full Assembly to terminate without a brief statement on behalf of His Majesty's Government who have been responsible for Palestine during the past thirty years and who have made their experience available to the United Nations at this time.
- after years of effort we have reached the conclusion that we cannot bring about a settlement in Palestine based upon the consent of Arabs and Jews, and we are unwilling to coerce either people in the interest of the other. While regretting that the United Nations have also failed in this effort, we should be the last to minimise the difficulty of the task which they undertook at our request and the first to appreciate the sincerity with which they have carried it out.
- consent means as we have made clear from the very outset of the debate in the Ad Hoc Committee that we cannot be counted on to provide the means of enforcing the proposals under discussion. We should have failed in our duty if we had not emphasised from the beginning the consequent need for the Assembly to consider the situation resulting from the removal of the forces which at present ensure law and order in Palestine. Their departure will leave a gap, and it has been the most difficult part of the Assembly's task to find means of filling that gap. Our sole concern is to avoid any misunderstanding concerning our own determination to complete the withdrawal of British forces on or about the 1st August, 1948, and in the

interval

interval not to make those forces available for the purpose of enforcing a settlement not based upon consent.

- A): I can assure the Assembly however that if this or any other proposal is finally adopted, the mandatory power will loyally accept it so far as it does not conflict with the conditions laid down in the Colonial Secretary's speech of the 26th September and in subsequent statements made on behalf of the United Kingdom delegation.
- This would add nothing to what has already been said more than once. Our position is on record, and a further restatement just before the vote may be represented as a lastminute effort to defeat the resolution. It probably would not have much effect one way or the other though it might sway 2 or 3 waverers who may have been hoping, up to the last minute, that we should be more forthcoming. I know that your preference, as indicated in your telegram No. 3875 was for no resolution. knew that you and the Colonial Secretary have considered fully what the resultant position will be. Nevertheless from here I would be worried if we were represented, as I think we should be, as having turned the scale at the last mement. There will probably be some trouble in Palestine in any event and particularly in Jerusalem but we give great advantage to our opponents and critics if we give them the opportunity of saying for all time that, if it had not been for our intervention this trouble could have been averted.
- 3. Sir Alexander Cadogan agrees with the arguments of the preceding paragraph as do other members of the delegation who have been consulted. I should add however in fairness that Harold Beeley and Morgan Man attach less weight to these arguments than to the fact that the Arabs are expecting us to make a statement in order to show that we at least have not modified our position as a result of American pressure, and so to encourage other delegations to vote in accordance with their own judgement. They fear that if we do not make a statement we may lose the credit we have gained with the Arabs by our attitude up to now.
- 4. There has been no opportunity of making the reservation suggested in your telegram No. 4069. This could be incorporated in a speech at the plenary if any were made. But we have already made it clear in Committee that His Majesty's Government will not regard themselves as bound by the detailed provisions of the partition plan.
- 5. The vote is likely to be taken tomorrow (Wednesday). We should therefore welcome a most immediate reply.

Foreign Office please pass immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 242.

[Copy sent to Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem].

k k k

November

B. A. B. B. UK Delegation New York.

Date / May 16

67 pher

Repear

Jerusalem

Washington

XXXXXXX XXXX Wher.

World Organisation.

Confidential GIANT

al no 4098 of 26 hou

Addressed U.K. Delegation, New York, Repeated for information to Jerusalem and Washington.

Your telegram No. 3539 [of November 25th: Palestine].

I feel it is desirable that a British statement should be made before the vote is taken, in order that there may be no doubt I agree generally with about our position. points suggested in your telegram, but suggest that framework of statement should be on following lines:-

- (a) We undertook by accepting the mandate to work for the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people on the understanding that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine. It was presumed that we could do this by agreement. We have made an honest and costly effort to reach these two objectives during the last twenty-five years, but we have not been successful.
- (b) As the mandate has become unworkable, we brought the problem to the United Nations. hoping that they would devise some way for attaining these objectives by agreement and

that/

which has been that we might be relieved of emr responsibility. the to discharge (c) We are not ourselves prepared to assume We did not acrept under the mandate bring to the affarently any new responsibility and we are not bound by the nethonicality of mandate to establish a Jewish or Arab unreconcilable attitude State by force, or to coerce either Arabs or Jews in the interests of the other, & we are not prepared to accept it now (d) We are therefore determined to lay to Wo wish of for down the mandate, and not to assume any further tasks involven the use of force against either side. By laying down the mandate and withdrawing our Administration and forces we will make way for any substitute authority which The, may be set up and will naturally not obstruct the carrying out of any decision which the on the other hand, we repeat United Nations may take. we will not allow our troops and administration to be used to enforce decisions which are not accepted by both parties in Palestine. (e) We have placed our knowledge and experience, at the disposal of the United LOOT the rearties Nations We have made our position as regards enforcement: abundantly clear from the Unfortunately other delegations de del beginning. The Brilish Goodnot seem to have taken our statements as seriously as they deserved and we have therefore felt bound to take this final opportunity of making clear that we fully meant what w

> [Approved by PM, SJSS Colonial Sec] BASB 261/1

2. There is no need to make further reservations

with regard to my telegram No. 4069.

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Out The

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Cypher/OTP.

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK.

(To United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations).

No. 4098.

D. 3.40 p.m. 26th November 1947.

26th November 1947.

Repeated to: Jerusalem and

Washington No. 12195 (Immediate).

MOST IMMEDIATE.

GIANT:

CONFIDENTIAL.

Addressed United Kingdom Delegation, New York, telegram No. 4098 of 26th November. Repeated for information to Jerusalem and Washington.

Your telegram No. 3539 [of November 25th: Palestine].

I feel it is desirable that a British statement should be made before the vote is taken, in order that there may be no doubt about our position. I agree generally with points suggested in your telegram, but suggest that framework of statement should be on following lines:-

- work for the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people on the understanding that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine. It was presumed that we could do this by agreement. We have made an honest and costly effort to reach these two objectives during the last twenty-five years, but we have not been successful.
- (b) As the mandate has proved unworkable, we brought the problem to the United Nations, hoping that they would devise some way for attaining these objectives by agreement and that we might be relieved of a responsibility, which has been impossible to discharge owing to the apparently unreconcilable attitude of the two communities.
- (c) We did not accept under the mandate the responsibility of establishing a Jewish er Arab State by force, or of coercing either Arabs or Jews in the interests of the other, and we are not prepared to accept it now.

(d) We have therefore decided with regret to lay down the mandate. We wish after all our efforts it had been otherwise but we cannot now assume this further task likely to involve the use of force by our troops against either side. By laying down the mandate and withdrawing our Administration and forces we will make way for a United Nations authority and will naturally not obstruct the carrying out of any decision which the United Nations may take. On the other hand, we repeat we can not allow our troops and Administration to be used to enforce decisions which are not accepted by both parties in Palestine.

(e) We have unstintingly placed our knowledge and experience at the disposal of the United Nations and of the two parties. We have made our position as regards enforcement abundantly clear from the beginning. Unfortunately some delegations did not seem to have taken our statements at the outset as seriously as they deserved. The British Government gave long and anxious consideration to this conclusion and we have therefore felt bound to take this final opportunity of making clear that we fully meant what the British representatives have consistently said.

2. There is no need to make further reservations with regard to my telegram No. 4069.

W:W:A:A:A

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Cypher/OTP

ORID ONGLED TION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

Na. 3529

D. 3.32 p.m. 25th Nevember, 1947.

25th Nevember, 1947.

R. 8.53 p.m. 25th Nevember, 1947.

Repeated to : Washington Jerusalem

111131

IMMEDIATE GLANT

SO YOU

Addressed Foreign Office telegram No. 3529 of 25th November repeated Washington and Jerusalem.

Palestine Committee.
Voting on the proposals before Committee began at the
third meeting on November 24th. We have telegraphed
separately the amendments so far introduced into resolution
of Sub-Committee Onc.

- 1. On motion of Paredi (France) the first draft resolution of Sub-Committee Two was divided into two parts, with the object of isolating question of Assembly's competence to enforce or recommend enforcement of partition from the other questions which under this proposal would be referred to the International Court. The part of resolution thus isolated was defeated by one vote (twenty against twenty-one, with twelve abstentions). The remainder was defeated by a larger margin (eighteen against twenty-five, with eleven abstentions).
- 2. The second resolution of Sub-Committee Two, dealing with refugees and displaced persons, was voted on in an amended form. It obtained sixteen votes, with sixteen against and twenty-three abstentions. Chairman ruled that, if another vote could not be taken in Committee, the resolution should be brought to Assembly's attention. During previous voting on parts of this resolution, a clause in the preamble declaring that Palestine could take no more immigrants was defeated with eleven votes against twenty-six, and eighteen abstentions.
- 3. Third resolution containing Arab plan for a Unitary State obtained twelve votes, with twenty-nine against and fourteen abstentions. The Arab Delegations were supported by Afghanistan, Cuba, Persia, Liberia, Pakistan and Turkey.
- 4. It cannot be assumed that all those who voted against the Arab plan will vote for partition. Our present estimate is that there are twenty-five twenty-seven votes for partition and fourteen or fifteen against it. But we cannot exclude possibility that some delegations which abstain at Committee state will be induced to vote for partition in Assembly.

Foreign Office please pass Immediate Jerusalem as my telegram No. 236.

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section, Colonial Office, for repetition to Jerusalem.]

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En Clair



FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)

No. 3537 25th November, 1947 D: Omitted 25th November, 1947 R: 5.55 a.m. 26th November, 1947

Repeated to: Jerusalem

ashington (Saving)

GIANT

Addressed Foreign Office telegram No. 3537 25th November, 1947 repeated to Jerusalem and Saving to Washington.

My telegrams 3439 and 239 to Jerusalem.

The boundary changes in the Beersheba sub-district which were today adopted by the Ad Hoc Committee will transfer to the proposed Arab state 6500 settled Arabs of Beersheba town and some 14,000 Bedouin. Revised figures of populations (settled and Bedouin together) as at 51st December 1946 in the two states and in the area of the city of Jerusalem as now recommended to the General Assembly by the Ad Hoc Committee are as follows:

Arab State, Arabs 847,000

Jews 10,000

Total 857,000.

Tewish State Arabs 405.000

Jewish State, Arabs 405,000 Jews 498,000 Total 903,000.

City of Jerusalem, Arabs 105,000 Jews 100,000 Total 205,000.

Total Arabs 1,357,000 Jews 608,000 Total 1,965,000.

Foreign Office please pass to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 240.

[Copy sent to Colonial Office Telegraph Section for repetition to Jerusa].

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744 LAST 393	E 11142
1947	PALESTINE 26 ACV
Registry E11142/957/31. Number TELEGRAM FROM UN A Neel No. Dated Received in Registry \ 25 1/cm 26 -	Palalish Boundaries. Genes positive large of large of decryption of the boundaries of the Grant Hotel following adaption of US Proposal a regard to Beenhold and the Repets and the Regels apported - para 1. of New York (1 35,35. (E11146).
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371/61890

EN CLAIR

ORTO ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM HETTED PICKET DELEGATION NEW YORK TO JERUSALEM

No:239

25th November 1947

25.h November 1947

Repeated to Foreign Office No: 3536

Washington Saving

GIANT

Addressed Jerusalem telegram No: 239 25th November, repeated Foreign Office and Saving to Washington.

The United States proposal in regard to Beersheba and the Negeb adopted today (paragraph 1 (9) of my telegram No: \$555 to Foreign Office) effects the following changes in the description of the boundaries of the Arab state given in my telegram No: 215 (not repeated to Foreign Office).


- (1) Substitute the following for the penultimate and third last sentences of the fourth paragraph "it then runs across the tribal lands of 'Arab El Jubarat to a point on the boundary between the sub-districts of Beersheba and Hebron, westerny direction to a point on the Beersheba-Gaza main westerny direction to a point on the Beersheba-Gaza main road two kilometres to the north-west of the town. It then turns south-eastwards to reach Wadi Sab' at a point situated turns south-eastwards to reach Wadi Sab' at a point situated one kilometre to the west of it. From here it turns north-eastwards and proceeds along Wadi Sab' and along the Beer eastwards and proceeds along wadi Sab' and along the Beer turns eastwards and runs in a straight line to Kh. Kuseifa to join the Beersheba-Hebron sub-district boundary".
- (2) Substitute the following for the last sentence of the sixth paragraph "from there it follows the boundary line of this village to its southernmost point. It then runs in a southerly direction along the vertical grid line 90 to its junction with the herizontal grid line 70. It then turns junction with the herizontal grid line 70. It then turns junction with the herizontal grid line 70. It then turns southerly direction to a point known as El Baha, beyond which it crosses the Beersheba-El Auja main road to the west of it crosses the Beersheba-El Auja main road to the west of the morthete west of El Subeita. From there it turns to the morthete the west of El Subeita. From there it turns to the morthete the west of Abda to join Wadi Nafkh. It then bulges to the east of Abda to join Wadi Nafkh. It then bulges to the south-west along Wadi Nafkh, Wadi Ajrim, and Wadi Lassan the point where Wadi Lassan crosses the Egyptian frontier".
- 2. Map illustrating these changes is being sent to you by air.

Foreign Office please pass to Jerusalem as my telegram No; 239.

[Copy sent to Colonial Office Telegraph Section for repetition to Jerusalem].

444.

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En clair.

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION.

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3535.

D. Untimed. 25th November, 1947.

R. 7.10 a.m. 26th November, 1947.

Repeated to Jerusalem,
Washington - Saving.

GIANT.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 3535 25th November, repeated Jerusalem and saving Washington.

Palestine.

My telegram 3528.

Following further amendments to report of subcommittee One were adopted by the ad hoc committee this morning:-

(1) Last three lines of paragraph 5 of Chapter 2 of Section C. in Part I and of paragraph 12 (5) of Section C. in Part III to read as follows:-

"The enterprise of religious or charitable bodies of all faiths or to discriminate against any representative or member of these bodies on the ground of his religion or nationality"

(Proposed by France)

(2) The following to be added at the end of paragraph 6 of Chapter 2 of Section C. in part I and also of paragraph 12 (6) of Section C. in Part III.

"Foreign educational establishments shall continue their activity on the basis of their existing rights"

(Proposed by France).

- (3) Delete all that part of paragraph 8 of Chapter 2 following the words "except for public purposes". (Proposed by Pakistan and in part by the Netherlands. The last sentence of the Netherlands amendment ((B) in my telegram 222 to Jerusalem) was opposed by Guatemala on the grounds that it would be impossible to implement and was not carried. The Netherlands reserved the right to put forward a revised amendment in the Plenary Session).
- (4) Insert the words "from the date of recognition of independence of the state in which they reside" efter the words "may opt within one year" in the second sentence of paragraph 1 of Chapter 3.

(Proposed by Canada).

(5)

of Chapter 3 "Arabs residing in the area of the proposed Jewish state and Jews residing in the area of the proposed Arab State who have signed a notice of intention to opt for citizenship of the other State shall be eligible to vote in the elections to the Constituent Assembly of that State but not in the elections to the Constituent Assembly of the State in which they reside".

(Proposed by Canada)

(6) Add the following sentence at the end of paragraph 9 of Section D.

"During the first two years after the termination of the mandate the Joint Economic Board shall have the authority to take such measures as may be necessary to ensure that to the extent that the total foreign exchange revenues of the two States from the export of goods and services permit and provided that each State takes appropriate measures to conserve its own foreign exchange resources, each State shall have available in any twelve months period foreign exchange sufficient to assure the supply of quantities of imported goods and services for consumption in its territory equivalent to the quantities of such goods and services consumed in that territory in the twelve months period ending December 31st, 1947".

(Proposed by United States).

of Section D. "After these obligations have been met in full the surplus revenue from the Customs and other common services shall be divided in the following manner: not less than five per cent and not more than ten per cent to the city of Jerusalem and the residue shall be allocated to each State by the Joint Economic Board equitably with the objective of maintaining a sufficient and suitable level of Government and social services in each State except that the share of either State shall not exceed the amount of that State's contribution to the revenues of the Economic Union by more than approximately four million pounds in any year. The amount granted may be adjusted by the Board according to the price level in relation to the prices prevailing at the time of the establishment of the Union. After five years the principles of the distribution of the joint revenues may be revised by the Joint Economic Board on a basis of equity".

(Proposed by United States).

(8) Substitute "consult" for "negotiate" in the third line of paragraph 2 of Section E. (The delegate of Pakistan had proposed the deletion of the whole of this paragraph on the grounds that the mandatory had declared that until the mandate terminated she would not share responsibility with the Commission.

TO 371/61890

His proposal was not carried, the substitution of the word "consult" for "negotiate" being regarded as sufficient to cover Pakistan's point).

(9) Amend the description of the boundaries in Part II so as to include in the Arab State Beersheba Town and the land to the north of the town and an area along the Egyptian frontier.

(United States amendment).

(10) Substitute the following for the fifth sentence of C.2 of Part III:

"He shall be assisted by an administrative staff classed as international officers in the meaning of Article 100 of the Charter and chosen whenever practicable from the residents of the city and of the rest of Palestine on a non discriminatory basis". (A Swedish proposal to delete the words "and chosen whenever possible from the residents of the city on a non-discriminatory basis" was rejected 10 for and 15 against after a speech by the United States delegate who strongly opposed it and suggested the substitute wording finally adopted).

(11) To re-word the third and fourth sentences of Section D. of Part III as follows and to delete the last sentence:

"After the expiration of this period, the whole scheme shall be subject to re-examination by the Trustee-ship Council in the light of the experience acquired with its functioning. The residents of the city shall be then free to express by means of a referendum their wishes as to possible modifications of the régime of the city".


(Proposed by Sweden carried after opposition had been expressed by the Seviet Union and Poland).

2. A French proposal to add the words "and particularly English and French" at the end of paragraph C. 10 of Part III was opposed in a speech by the Soviet delegate and defeated thirteen for and fifteen against.

3. An amendment proposed by Pakistan to delete the whole of Part II and substitute the following was defeated eight for and twenty-two against "the boundaries of the Arab and Jewish States shall be recommended by a Commission composed of three boundary experts appointed by the Security Council so as (A) Not to include within the boundaries of the Arab State more Arab owned lands than would constitute ten per cent of the total area of the State exclusive of State and waste lands. For the purpose of demarcating the boundaries the lands cultivated by the Beersheba Bedouin within the sub-district of Beersheba shall be regarded as Arab owned lands. The recommendations of the Boundary Commission shall become effective as soon as they have been approved by the Security Council".

Fercign Office please pass to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 238.

[Copy sent to Colonial Office Telegraph Section for repetition to Jerusalem].



COPYRIGHT OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

Reference:-EO

371 / 61890

Please elucidate

Newford your amendment (8) as we can only find one heary haragraph in bection to, which does not contain the word "negotiate".

3. Finally, it would be of arrivance to us ef, when electing further amendments, your would about a purchase your four select to puragraphs by the same numbers as those wild in UNSCOP refort quoting, where necessary, ofening words of rub haragraphs.

OTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

E11146/951/31

OUTFILE

En clair

FILES

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK

(To United Kingdom Delegation to United Mations)

No. 4121

November 27th, 1947. D. 4.20 p.m. November 27th, 1947.

IMMEDIATE

Your telegram No. 3535 [of November 25th]. Amendments to report of sub-committee One.

- this report incorporating the various amendments from time to time reported by you. We have been unable to link up three of the amendments contained in your telegram under reference with the text of the U.N.S.C.O.P. report either in its United Nations or its His Majesty's Stationery Office editions.
- 2. These are the amendments numbered (1), (2) and (8) in your telegram under reference. (1) does not appear to make sense. Please, therefore, telegraph the complete text of paragraph 5 of Chapter 2 of Section C in Part I, as finally amended. Please confirm that by paragraph 6 of the same Chapter and section you mean paragraph 6 as printed in U.N.S.C.O.P. report and amended by your telegram to Jerusalem No. 222, since in your amendment (3) you call this paragraph 8. Please elucidate your amendment (8) as we can only find one paragraph in Section E, which does not contain the word "negotiate".
- reporting further amendments, you would refer to paragraphs by the same numbers as those used in U.N.S.C.O.P. report quoting, where necessary, opening words of sub-paragraphs.

SSSSS

eig. the Storice Energy Commission which was also set up under an Assembly Resolution and that It could stait the work in that needing a Sicurity Council besolute first.

I do not much like the specific Enjoinder on the Security Council to have recourse in culain circumstances to thicks 39 and 41 of the Charles; this seems to me essentially a matter for the Cancil strelf to clearle in the Circumstances which may arise.

1 suggest a redraft- as in

the altached Sheet

Thaser 11.

Seen by M Burrows.

Tel. fent fig nr. 28

My from Potale 2298 1/12.

Uni has gone to UK. Del.

don't trink there is anything for their in it that need be telegraphed to the Commission posts.

M. s. Dent Du. 10

10.10

En Clair

WORLD ORGANISMIZON NONTRIBUTION

· Think

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3538. D. Untimed 25th November, 1947. 25th November, 1947. R. 6.48 a.m. 26th November, 1947.

Repeated to Jerusalem and Saving Washington. GIANT.

Addressed F.O. No. 3538, repeated Jerusalem and Saving Washington.

My telegram No. 3454. Palestine.

The delegation of Denmark yesterday tabled in the Ad Hoc Committee an amendment to the draft resolution proposed by Sub-Committee One. This sought to revise the operative part of the resolution to read as follows and was clearly intended to meet objections that the plan of Sub-Committee One had no legal basis under the Charter:

"Requests that:

- (a) the Security Council take the necessary measures as provided for in the plan for its implementation;
- (b) the Security Council by virtue of its authority under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter in order to maintain international peace and security take measures to empower a United Nations Commission as provided in this resolution to exercise in Palestine the functions which are assigned to it by this resolution;
- (c) the Security Council determine as a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter any attempt to alter by force the settlement brought into effect by this resolution:
- (d) the Trusteeship Council be informed of [gp.undec.] responsibilities envisaged for it in this plan".
- 2. This morning the delegation of Denmark tabled a revised version of this amendment substituting the following for clauses:(b) and (c):
- "(b) The Security Council consider if circumstances during the transitional period require such consideration, whether the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace. If it decides that such a threat exists and in order to maintain international peace and security the Security Council should supplement the authorisation of the General Assembly by taking measures under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter to empower the United Nations Commission as provided in this resolution to exercise in Palestine the functions which are assigned to it by this resolution;
- (c) the Security Council determine as a threat tenthe peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter any attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged by this resolution".


5./

5. The delegates of Canada and the United States speke in favour of the revised amendment which was carried by 19 votes to 14. Herschel Johnson said that he would not have been able to support the amendment as originally worded. The Seviet delegate abstained from this vote.

Fereign Office please pass to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 241.


[Copy sent to Telegraph Section, Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem].

555



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Reference:
371 / 61890



to report in its turn to the Assembly. 37 JB MW. 28

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1 2 3 * 5 6 Reference:- 371 61890

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E11147/95**1/31** Confidential

Cypher/OTP

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK

(To United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)

No. 4139

D. 2.45 p.m. 28th November, 1947.

28th November, 1947.

Repeated to Washington No. 12294 Jerusalem

IMPORTANT

CONFIDENTIAL

GIANT

Addressed to United Kingdom Delegation New York telegram No. 4139 of November 28th repeated for information to Washington and Jerusalem.

In the event of partition being approved, can you please clarify the connexion between the United Nations Commission and the Security Council? We assume that Commission would be able to operate at once in virtue of Assembly resolution without first awaiting or requiring a Security Council resolution, but that it will report in the first instance to Security Council (which is to be charged with implementation of plan approved by Assembly resolution) and that it will be for Security Council to watch over working of plan and to report in its turn to the Assembly.

///

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1 2 3 * 5 6 Reference:- 371 61890

INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES

Cypher (O.T.P.)

12147 961 3

FROM PALESTINE (Gen. Sir A. Cunningham)

D. let December, 1947.

R. 1st " "

19.07 hrs.

IMPORTANT

No.2298 Secret.

Addressed to S. of S. Repeated to Washington, No.278 (please pass to U.K. Delegation, New York).

U.K. Delegation telegram to the Foreign Office No.3538 (your telegram No.3077).

I suggest that the following points which have already been made explicit by or implicitly in the British declarations in U.N. be again tactfully impressed on Bolivian and Panamanian delegates:-

- (a) that sovereignty in Palestine remains vested in H.M. Government until the termination of the mandate and that it will not be possible to transfer any of the functions of the sovereign to the U.N. Commission until the abolition of the mandate as a whole.
- (b) that U.N. Commission should not address requests to the mandatory administration which would involve for their fulfilment steps equivalent to implementation by mandatory administration under decision.
- (c) that both before and after the cessation of the mandate and up to the time of the withdrawal of British forces, the Commission should refrain from action which would be likely to lead to disturbances by either Jews or Arabs.
- (d) that the Commission, after the termination of the mandate, should do all in its power to see that its actions did not impede the progress of our military withdrawal.

2. I also suggest that it might be impressed upon these two delegates that the consistent aim of H.M. Government has been and is to promote the interests and well being of the inhabitants of Palestine irrespective of community and that, subject to the qualifications in the preceding paragraph, the Commission may look for full assistance and co-operation from the mandatory administration to this end.

only, who says out that was said officially will be

3. The question of the date of the Commission's arrival will no doubt be dealt with separately.

Copies sent to:-

Foreign Office

- Communications Department.

30471 F.O.P

11162

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CYPHER/OTP

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)

No. 3.548.

D: 7.50 p.m. 26th November, 1947.

26th November, 1947.

R: 1.05 a.m. 27th November, 1947.

Repeated to: Jerusalem,

Washington.

11161

MOST IMMEDIATE

<u>GIANT</u>

Addressed to telegram No. 3,548 26th November repeated Jerusalem and Washington.

Following for Resident Clerk.

Palestine.

The debate in the Assembly was adjourned at 6.20 this evening and will be resumed on Friday when the vote will probably be taken.

- The best estimates of probable voting give 30 votes for partition and 15 against. This would provide the majority of two thirds but the figures do not include the Siamese delegation which has disappeared, or the Liberian, which may possibly cast its vote with the Arabs.
- The five new votes for partition in addition to the 25 cast in the Committee, are those of France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and New Zealand.
- Sir A. Cadegan intervened in the debate this morning to make the statement contained in my immediately following telegram.

Foreign Office please pass Immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 243.

[Advance copy sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem.
Advance copies sent to Resident Clerk and Brigadier Cornwall
Jones Cabinet Offices.] 61890

@@@

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTAENTAL No. 1.

FROM AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir A. Kirkbride D. 11.00 a.m. 26th November, 1947. R. 11.13 a.m. 26th November, 1947. No. 350 4 26th November, 1947.

Repeated to British Middle Mast Office Cairos

Addressed Foreign Office telegram No. 350 November 26th repeated to British Middle East Office Cairo.

Reference Clayton telegram No. 579.

Transjordan minister at Cairo would be unlikely to make such a suggestion on his own initiative. Scheme sounds like one of the King's wilder proposals which would not be agreed to by the Prime minister hence circuitous method of putting it forward.

FFFF

Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL No. 1.

44

FROM AMMAN TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Sir A. Kirkbride
No. 350
26th November, 1947.

D. 11.00 a.m. 26th November, 1947. R. 11.13 a.m. 26th November, 1947.

Repeated to British Middle East Office Cairos

Addressed Foreign Office telegram No. 350 November 26th repeated to British Middle East Office Cairo.

Reference Clayton telegram No. 579.

Transjordan Minister at Cairo would be unlikely to make such a suggestion on his own initiative. Scheme sounds like one of the King's wilder proposals which would not be agreed to by the Prime Minister hence circuitous method of putting it forward.

FFFF



, MEGOND OFFICE, LONDON

1 / 61890

En Clair

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)

No. 3549

D. 8.35 p.m. 26th November, 1947

26th November, 1947.
Repeated to Jerusalem
Washington

R. 2.11 a.m. 27th November, 1947

MOST IM EDIATE

GIANT

Addressed Foreign Office telegram No. 3549 26th November repeated Jerusalem and Washington. WV

My immediately preceding telegram.

Following is text.

[Begins]

I wish to make a very few remarks before this long debate closes. It was on the initiative of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom that the General Assembly placed the problem of Palestine's future government on its agenda. In view of this fact, and of the responsibility which they have exercised for the administration of Palestine during the past thirty years, it seems fitting that a few words should be spoken in their name to-day.

2. In accepting the Mandate for Palestine after the first world war His Majesty's Government undertook to work for the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people on the understanding that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine. It was assumed at that time that the objects of the Mandate could be carried out with the consent and co-operation of both peoples. Time has shown that this assumption was incorrect. After years of strenuous but unavailing effort His Majesty's Government have reached the conclusion that they are not able to bring about a settlement in Palestine based upon the consent of both Arabs and Jews and that the Mandate is no longer workable. It is for this reason that they have brought the problem before the United Nations, hoping that the General Assembly would be more successful in the search for an agreed settlement.

The swith deep regret that my Government recognise that an agreed settlement has still not been found. I do not say that in any spirit of criticism.

My Government would be the last to minimise the difficulty of the task, as they are the first to appreciate the efforts which have been made. The fact remains that we are obviously confronted with a failure to arrive at a settlement based upon consent. My delegation would have failed in its duty if we had not emphasised from the beginning of the session the consequent need for the Assembly to consider the situation which is likely to arise upon the removal of the forces which at present ensure law and order in Palestine.

/Their departure

Their departure will leave a gap, and it has been the most difficult part of the Assembly's task to find means of filling this gap.

- 4. My Government do not consider that the Mandate required them to establish either a Jewish State or an Arab State in Palestine by force, or to coerce either people in the interests of the other, nor are they prepared now to accept any responsibility which would involve the use of British troops as the means for enforcing a decision against either people.
- 5. As I have already informed the Ad Hoc Committee my Government have consequently decided to lay down the Mandate and intend to complete the withdrawal of British forces from Palestine by the 1st August, 1948. By so doing they will make way for a United Nations authority, should the Assembly decide to establish such an authority, and they will naturally not obstruct the carrying out of any decision which the Assembly may take.
- The Mandatory power has placed its knowledge and experience at the disposal, first of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine and subsequently of the General Assembly. I can assure the Assembly that, if the present draft resolution is adopted, my Government will loyally accept it in so far as its terms do not conflict with the conditions laid down in the Colonial Secretary's speech of 26th September, 1947 and subsequent statements made by my delegation. Unfortunately it appears that those statements were not accepted at their face value by all delegations. I am therefore instructed to repeat explicitly that the United Kingdom Government cannot allow their troops and administration to be used in order to enforce decisions which are not accepted by both parties in Palestine. My Government have given long and anxious consideration to this decision, and they have therefore felt bound to take this final opportunity of making clear that they fully endorse what has consistently been said here by my delegation.

Foreign Office please pass Immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 244

[Advance copy sent to Telegraph Section Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem.]

[Advance copy sent to Resident Clerk.]

///



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Mr. Jebb	Mr. G. M. Wilson (Cabinet Offices)
Mr. Troutbeck	Mr. C. K. Edmonds (Min. of Health)
Mr. Beckett	Mr. Shackle (Board of Trade)
Mr. Gallop	Mr. Field-Robinson (Treasury)
Mr. R. B. Stevens	Mr. J. E. Wall (Min. of Food)
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Mr. Gore-Booth	Mr. A. Campbell (Colonial Office)
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Mr. Goodwin	tions Office)
	Mr. A. F. Morley (Burma Office)
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Miss Salt	Mr. O. C. Allen (Home Office)
Mr. Wilkinson	Mr. H. Townshend (G.P.O.)
Mr. Arculus	Dr. G. North (Registrar-General)
F Dept	Mr. B. R. Curson (Commonwealth Relations Office)
	Mr. F. Pickford (Min. of Labour)
	Mr. J. S. Nicholson (Min. of Nat. Insurance)
•••••	Mr. H. Campion (C. Stat. Office)
	Major W. H. Coles (Home Office)
	-

C.B.—Do not remove this slip when entering. 14301—3 34456 (4)

I.O.C.(N.Y.)(47) II 45th Meeting.
24th November, 1947.

There will be a final meeting of the United Kingdom Delegation to the General Assembly on Tuesday, 25th November, at 9.15 a.m.

R.P. HEPPEL 24th November, 1947. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Reference:- COPYRIGHT OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

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- E Ropl	Office)
	Mr. F. Pickford (Min. of Labour)
	Mr. J. S. Nicholson (Min. of Nat. Insurance)
	Mr. H. Campion (C. Stat. Office)
	Major W. H. Coles (Home Office)

C.B.—Do **not** remove this slip when entering. 14301—3 34456 (4)

61890

I.O.C.(N.Y.)(47) II 45th Meeting.

25th November, 1947.

RECORD OF THE 45TH MEETING OF THE UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, HELD AT THE EMPIRE STATE BUILDING ON TUESDAY, 25TH NOVEMBER, AT 9.30 A.M.

Item 1. PALESTINE.

After Mr. Martin had made a report on the proceedings in the Ad Hoc Committee on the previous day, a discussion developed as to whether the United Kingdom delegation should make a further statement in Plenary session.

It was argued against the proposal that the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards the Palestine problem had been made quite clear in several statements and that to make a further statement would provoke accusations that the United Kingdom Delegation were trying to deter delegations from voting in favour of partition and thereby to prevent the partition plan from obtaining a 2/3rds majority in the Assembly. The Minister of State expressed the view that the partition plan would probably get the requisite majority and that the United Kingdom Delegation would be exposing themselves unnecessarily to criticism and condemnation if they made a further statement.

It was argued in favour of making a statement that it was the duty of the delegation to do so, although it was generally conceded that to do so at the last moment would inevitably cause a bad impression in certain quarters. This, however, could not be helped. It was pointed out that an analysis of the voting figures in the Ad Hoc Committee showed that a 2/3rds majority in favour of partition was far from certain, that the Secretariat estimate was 27 votes in favour and 16 against and that the United States estimate was only 25 in favour and 18 against. A further cause of uncertainty was the Danish amendment which would place responsibility for the Commission on the Security Council rather than on the Assembly. This amendment would probably win more votes for partition but the United States delegation had been opposed to the suggestion hitherto and it was not known what line they would take.

After further discussion of the implications of the Danish proposals and possible courses of action open to the Security Council the meeting agreed that on balance and in view of the fact that the Foreign Office were not opposed to the suggestion the United Kingdom delegation should make a statement in the Plenary Session. It was also agreed that in making this statement the United Kingdom Delegation should make it clear that their concurrence in all the details of any plan before the Assembly was not to be assumed by virtue of the fact that they did not oppose the plan as a whole. In particular it would be necessary for the United Kingdom Delegation to reserve its position on those sections of the plan dealing with the regime for Jerusalem, the evacuation by the Mandatory of a port in the proposed Jewish state and the question of the inheritance by the successor states of certain commitments entered into by the Palestine Government.

1.0.C.(N.Y.)(47) II (95) 26th November, 1947.

UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION

TO THE

UNITED NATIONS.

ADVANCE CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY ADVANCE CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY

The following is a Speech to be delivered by Sir Alexander Cadegan, on the Palestinian Question, to the Plenary Session of the General Assembly, Flushing, New York, on 26th November, 1947.

I wish to make a very few remarks before this long debate closes. It was on the initiative of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom that the General Assembly placed the problem of Palestine's future government on its agenda. In view of this fact, and of the responsibility which they have exercised for the administration of Palestine during the past thirty years, it seems fitting that a few words should be spoken in their name to-day.

In accepting the mandate for Palestine after the first World War, His Majesty's Government undertook to work for the establishment of a National Home for the Jewish people on the understanding that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine. It was assumed at that time that the objects of the markate could be carried out with the consent and co-speration of both peoples. Time has shown that this assumption was incorrect. After years of strenuous but unavailing effort, His Majesty's Government have reached the conclusion that they are not able to bring about a settlement in Palestine based upon the consent of both Arabs and Jews and that the mandate is no longer workable. It is for this reason that they have brought the problem before the United Nations, hoping that the General Assembly would be more successful in the search for an agreed settlement.

It is with deep regret that my Government recognise that an agreed settlement has still not been found. I do not say that in any spirit of criticism. My Government would be the last to minimise the difficulty of the task, as they are the first to appreciate the efforts which have been /made

made. The fact remains that we are obviously confronted with a failure to arrive at a settlement based upon consent. My Delegation would have failed in its duty if we had not emphasized from the beginning of the session the consequent need for the Assembly to consider the situation which is likely to arise upon the removal of the forces which at present ensure law and order in Palestine. Their departure will leave a gap, and it has been the most difficult part of the Assembly's task to find means of filling this gap.

My Government do not consider that the mandate required them to establish either a Jewish State or an Arab State in Palestine by force, or to coerce either people in the interests of the other, nor are they prepared now to accept any responsibility which would involve the use of British troops as the means for enforcing a decision against either people.

As I have already informed the Ad Hoc Committee, my Government have consequently decided to lay down the mandate and intend to complete the withdrawal of British forces from Palestine by the 1st August, 1948. By so doing they will make way for a United Nations authority, should the Assembly decide to establish such an authority, and they will naturally not obstruct the carrying out of any decision which the Assembly may take.

The Mendatory Power has placed its knowledge and experience at the disposal, first of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine and subsequently of the General Assembly. I can assure the Assembly that, if the present draft resolution is adopted, my Government will loyally accept it insofar as its terms do not conflict with the conditions laid down in the Colonial Sceretary's speech of 26th September, 1947, and in subsequent statements made by my Delegation. Unfortunately it appears that those statements were not accepted at their face value by all delegations. I am therefore instructed to repeat explicitly that the United Kingdom Government cannot allow their troops and administration to be used in order to enforce decisions which are not accepted by both parties in Palestine. My Government have given long and anxious consideration to this decision, and they have therefore folt bound to take this final opportunity of making clear that they fully endorse what has consistently been said here by my Delegation.

28 NOV

BRITISH EMBASSY.

WASHINGTON 8, D. C.

21st November 1947

Ref: 15/353/47

Dear Department,

Would you please refer to our telegram No.6163 of November 3rd about U.S. comment on Mr. Herschel Johnson's statement on Palestine on the 31st October.

- There was a considerable amount of uncritical rejoicing in the American press about the U.S.-Soviet compromise on Palestine which, from its novelty, tended to attract rather more attention than did the occasion for it. Comparatively few commentators stopped to think how such a proposal could be made effective, though previously some doubts on this score had been apparent. The Christian Science Monitor on November 6th, for example, devoted an editorial to this "core of the Palestine problem", pointing out that the need for placing U.N. forces in Palestine should be squarely faced by the members of the United Nations who were taking a leading part in the debate. The newspaper referred to unhappy British experiences in the past and to the effects of U.S. intervention unaccompanied by willingness to accept responsibility and found the Soviet proposal for local militias unlikely to achieve peace. It held that, if any progress were to be made, the U.N. must go beyond a paper contribution and beyond the same sort of advice to Britain as the U.S. Government had previously proferred. It suggested that the gap should be filled under Article 106 of the Charter.
- Stewart Alsop, in his column of November 9th, held that the U.S. was "too blithe about Palestine". He did not agree with the apparent contention of the U.S. Delegation that the two states could be established

/without

Eastern Department, Foreign Office. London, S.W.1.

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without use of force. He considered that really serious trouble was to be expected from the Arabs and particularly from the Mufti, whose influence was increasing. He alleged that the Soviet Union too was fishing in troubled waters and that at least one shipment of arms for the Arabs had arrived at Latakia from Danzig. Small neutrals were unlikely to be willing to be shot at in the task of imposing partition nor did the U.S. Government wish to see Soviet troops in Palestine. Partition, which was the only solution, could, he concluded, have been imposed by the British soon after the war if they had had unequivocal American backing. A rather more detailed and quite sensible analysis of the problems involved, not only in keeping the peace but in organising an international force, was contained in George Fielding Eliot's column of November 14th, of which a copy is enclosed.

The Christian Science Monitor, which was among the papers hailing the American-Soviet accord, considered it questionable whether Britain was morally bound to implement a U.N. decision, since American, and to a lesser extent Soviet, interests were served by the solution proposed. For this reason it concluded that the least these two countries could do would be to send a token force. The Baltimore Sun of November 12th took a stronger line in calling the accord unrealistic. This newspaper said that it begged the questions how the British could possibly keep a grip on the situation while themselves withdrawing and how order could be kept if there were a gap between the British withdrawal and independence. The flaw in this latest agreement, the editorial concluded, was that the plain obligation on the United Nations to make the solution stick had been disregarded. The newspapers taking this view however were in a minority. The New York Herald Tribune felt that Britain could hardly refuse the added contribution required of her in order to assist a compromise for bringing to an end thirty years of unhappy history, and the pro-Zionist New York Post thought that such a refusal would be entirely unreasonable.

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- 5. Sir A. Cadogan's statement of the British position on November 13th received a considerable amount of publicity in the press though little on the wireless. Both the New York Times and the New York Herald Tribune considered it to be mystifying. A summary of the latter's views was contained in the U.K. Delegation, New York's telegram to the Foreign Office No. 3397 of November 15th.
- Other writers considered that the really important point was the extent to which Britain would co-operate with the U.N. in the transfer of power. One of these was Bernstein in P.M. who said that a liberal view was being taken in New York of Sir Alexander Cadogan's statement that Britain would not obstruct partition, because there was no alternative to such a view. It was in fact hoped that the British would at the very least be prepared to hand over in an orderly fashion to the U.N. Commission each section of Palestine as and when it was being evacuated. Thus the British statement was held by Bernstein to open the door to a minimum amount of co-operation. P.M.'s second thoughts under the heading "British put $U.\overline{N}$. in position of supplicant on Palestine" were slightly less optimistic even than this. But the newspaper still hoped that some arrangement between the Mandatory and the U.N. Commission might be reached.
- 7. Other papers again were hostile. The Philadelphia Inquirer, for example, accused the British of adhering to the old and familiar policy of rigid obstruction in an attempt to preserve the status quo in Palestine. The British were telling the U.N. to go ahead with partition, but at their own risk and without British help.
- 8. There is in general little disposition to urge that the U.N. themselves should provide the teeth for implementation; such a proposal is confined to a few more thoughtful writers and newspapers, of which mention has been made above, and to a few strongly pro-Zionist newspapers and periodicals such as the New York Post and The Nation which see in it the best

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hope of ensuring the security of the Jewish area, which might be jeopardised as a result of the British withdrawal. Most comments assume either that Britain ought to be prepared to extend a minimum of co-operation to the U.N. Commission or that all will be well as a result of U.S.-Soviet agreement and any suggestion that U.S. troops might be used is conspictously absent. On the major question it is generally held that U.S.-Soviet agreement has greatly improved the chances of partition itself and that it will secure U.N. approval, provided that the necessary minimum of British co-operation is not withheld.

We are sending a copy of this letter to the U.K. Delegation at New York and to Jerusalem.

Yours ever,

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Small Nations Could Furnish Armed Force Necessary to Make Palestine Plan Work, Says Eliot

Officers and Men in Contingents Should Be Volunteers, With Jews, Moslems Barred -Use of Army of Big Power Would Make It Difficult to Exclude Russia.

By GEORGE FIELDING ELIOT

HEN the General Assembly of the United Nations has reached final agreement on a Palestine settlement who is going to

Who is going to keep the peace in Palestine?

Someone will have to do it, unless we are to set down our fine words on futile paper and then pass by on the other side of the road while Jews and Arabs set about cutting each others' throats.

But you could not create out of

And even if you could get over

this difficulty, how would you pro-

vide for discipline, pay, pensions

for those who might be killed or

wounded, and all the hundred and

care of when any kind of military

Governments can do these

things; but they command the

Nations Must Provide Force.

resources, and of itself commands

is to police Palestine, it will have

The British are there now, but

So if we must have national

likely to be sought, aside from any

Would any smaller powers be

willing to take on such a job?

And if they would, do any of them

have armies sufficiently strong

The answer to the latter ques-

the smaller powers.

The United Nations has no such

supply armed forces

Assume that it is settled that controlled by and responsible to the British leave by the first of the British Government. May, as now proposed. There or small, is its discipline, which are almost 100,000 British troops arises from its loyalties, deeply inin Palestine. You do not just, grained in the hearts and spirits by a wave of the hand, waft 100. of its officers and soldiers. You 000 soldiers with all their arms could create an Arab force, with and equipment out of a country Arab loyalties, in Palestine. You with only one serviceable seaport. | could create a Jewish force, with

It will be a lengthy and gradual Jewish loyalties, in Palestine. process, dependent on the capacity of roads and railroads, of whole cloth an impartial force to docks and anchorages, the avail- police Palestine that would be ability of shipping urgently need- worth its salt, using persons haved for other purposes, and the ing no loyalties which were in any willingness of neighboring coun- way involved in the welfare and tries such as Syria, the Lebanon future of Palestine itself, owing and Egypt to permit part of the no true allegiance to any Pales-British garrison to pass through tine government and having no their territory and embark at greater tie to the performance of duty than a mere temporary ac-

And a whole host of problems ceptance of a task that would for immediately arises as to just how most of them be merely a means of escaping economic distress in the job will be done.

From what positions will the other lands or perhaps the long British withdraw first? From arm of somebody's police detecterritory that is to be Arab, or tives. territory that is to be Jewish? How much responsibility will the British Government, its Army and its present administrative organization in Palestine, continue to assume for the maintenance one details which must be taken of peace and order in Palestine force is to be created? during the weeks and perhaps months the evacuation will be in progress? Who will replace the British as they leave? And just how will this replacement be effected, supposing that a suitable sources with which to arm and suppose the loyalty of adequate numbers of human beings, and dispose of resources with which to arm and suppose the loyalty of adequate numbers of human beings, and dispose of resources with which to arm and suppose the loyalty of adequate numbers of human beings, but they loyalty of adequate numbers of human beings, but they loyalty of adequate numbers of human beings, and dispose of resources with which the loyalty of adequate numbers of human beings, and dispose of resources with which the loyalty of adequate numbers of human beings, and dispose of resources with which the loyalty of adequate numbers of human beings, and dispose of resources with which the loyalty of adequate numbers of human beings, and dispose of resources with which the loyalty of adequate numbers of human beings, and dispose of resources with which the loyalty of adequate numbers of human beings, and dispose of resources with which the loyalty of adequate numbers of human beings, and dispose of resources with which the loyalty of adequate numbers of human beings, and dispose of resources with which the loyalty of adequate numbers of human beings and dispose of resources with the loyalty of adequate numbers of human beings are not also have a loyalty of adequate numbers of human beings and human beings are not also have also have a loyalty of adequate numbers of human beings are not also have a loyalty of adequate numbers of human beings are not also have a loyalty of adequate numbers of human beings are not also have a loyalty of adequate numbers of human beings are not also have a loyalty of adequate numbers of human beings are not also have a loyalty of adequate numbers of human beings are not also have a loyalty of adequate numbers of human beings are not also have a loyalty of adequate numbers of human beings are not also have a loyalty of adequate numbers of human beings are not also have a loyalty of adequa

Method of Evacuation.

It is, I think, possible to find some of the answers to these no such loyalties on the part of questions in the record of the individuals. If the United Nations British in India.

They will not want to leave to do so by calling on member more of a mess behind them in states to provide the forces for Palestine than they can help. In such a purpose, which means that all probability they will, as far as it will have to find states that are possible, arrange to withdraw first willing and able to do so. If the of all from both Arab and Jewish British are willing to bear part areas which are not contiguous. of the load, as seems still possible In so small a country as Palestine, at this writing, who will bear the divided as irregularly as the in- rest? The United States? At presvestigating committee has recom- ent, this seems very unlikely. mended, this idea cannot be carried out 100 per cent. But this if any other great power were to will almost certainly be the guid- propose sending its forces into ing principle of the British evac- Palestine, it would be hard indeed uation plan: To hold the balance to prevent the Soviet Union from claiming the right to participate. even between Jew and Arab.

You can hear all sorts of ac- too, and the presence of Soviet cusations and prophecies of "dirty troops in the Middle East could work at the cross-roads" from hardly be regarded as an unmixed both sides—now. But remember blessing, to put it mildly, either that the same dire prophecies by London or Washington. were made by all parties in India | before the final decision for Brit- forces (and I can see no other ish evacuation was made; and practicable possibility) they are remember that since then we have possible British contingent, from heard scarcely a single responsible Indian voice raised to accuse the British of not having played the game fairly, once they had made up their minds to leave.

But that does not solve the problem of who is going to keep and well equipped to furnish the peace in Palestine when the contingents of the necessary British have gone, or while they strength? are in the process of going. Will the British take on the interim tion, fortunately, is yes. The anresponsibility? That decision rests swer to the former is of course

conjectural, and rests upon sevwith the British Cabinet. My own guess would be that the eral contingencies, of which the British will stick to what they question of finance is perhaps of have already said—that they will first importance. If the United not bear alone the burden of en-forcing in Palestine a United Na-United Nations were willing to tions settlement which is not ac- contribute their share of the cost, ceptable to both Jews and-Arabs: then it might be possible to find and no settlement that the wit of a solution.

on similar duty in the British

zone. It too is equipped with British weapons. A battalion, or even two battalions, might be drawn from this source, supplemented perhaps by volunteers from other units of the Belgian

1000 men) could be obtained for temporary duty in Palestine. There is also a Belgian division

The Swedish army is first-class n training, organization and equipment, and might provide a contingent of volunteers, though here there would be difficulty as to uniformity of armament with the British.

In order to have due representation from the Slav bloc, the Czechoslovak army might be invited to send a contingent. Its armament and equipment is Russian, and of course the willingness of the Czechoslovak government to participate in such a venture cannot be confidentially predicted.

There are several Latin American states with excellent armies from which a suitable contingent of volunteers for such service might be drawn. Notable among these are Brazil (which has a division that saw service in Italy during the late war), Argentina, Chile and Mexico.

The only small Asiatic state that possesses troops of the high standards required and that is not ruled out on other grounds is the Philippine Republic.

Troops From British Dominions. Finally there are the British Dominions, where the lure of adventure and far places might produce contingents of volunteers from their permanent armed forces or in some cases from veterans of the late war. There again we would find the advantage of uniformity of armament.

The troops of the several contingents should wear the uniforms of their own services. This would have a considerable moral effect, as marking the participation of several nations, under the authority of the United Nations, in the responsibility of policing Palestine. Symbols of this sort are especially important in Eastern countries

Naturally there would be a considerable problem in organizing contingents from several nations into a workable force. There would be language difficulties. too. But it should be remembered that this force is not going to fight a protracted campaign. It is going in to keep order for a limited period in a country where no organized attack is to be expected; hence the normal "equipment table" allowances of ammunition would probably be sufficient for all needs.

The participating states would have to agree on a top commander, who should not be British, and a scheme would have to be drawn up, in co-ordination with the British, as to just how and where and when units of the new force should take over. But there should be no "national occupation zones"; the United Nations Commission and under it, the chosen commander should have full authority to move units of the force wherever they might be required in Palestine.

Size of Security Force. The size of the force would not need to parallel the present British strength of almost 100,000. Probably 25,000 would be ample; perhaps less. From the military viewpoint, the plan is feasible. Whether it is possible politically rests with the nations that can make it so if they are willing.

It may be noted that it has been the constant aim of the lesser states to strengthen their power and influence within the United Nations structure. How better this could be done than by the acceptance of such a responsibility as above suggested is difficult to imagine.

At any rate, if the peace is to be kept in Palestine during the interim period between the British withdrawal and the establishment of self-contained Jewish and Arab states as going concerns presuming always that the General Assembly decides on a scheme of partition—it is certainly going to require the initial support of some kind of security force from outside the country.

In the search for means to accomplish this necessary purpose,

mended, this idea cannot be careven between Jew and Arab.

work at the cross-roads" from both sides—now. But remember that the same dire prophecies were made by all parties in India before the final decision for Britremember that since then we have sible Indian voice raised to accuse the British of not having played the game fairly, once they had made up their minds to leave.

British have gone, or while they strength? are in the process of going. Will the British take on the interim tion, fortunately, is yes. The anresponsibility? That decision rests swer to the former is of course with the British Cabinet.

and no settlement that the wit of a solution. man can devise could be that now.

Necessity of Military Force. However, it is possible that the British might agree to bear part of the load. There have been hints that they might do their share, Nations, if others would join with them. But what others? Who would be willing to accept a part

ministered, in the name of the United Nations, by a small-power commission of three or five memcommission of three or five mem-bers, until the respective Arab and form, out of these volunteers, a Jewish administrations can get complete unit—a battalion, for exunder way and have things run- ample-which would, as far as ning smoothly. But such a com- discipline and what we may call mission would be quite powerless higher control is concerned, conto do anything except issue pre- tinue to be a part of its armed cepts and admonitions unless it forces and subject to its eventual had at its disposal a loyal and suf- authority for the faithful discharge ficient force to maintain order of its duty. Fourth, neither Jews and enforce its decrees. If this nor Moslems could be permitted to force cannot be British, how will volunteer for this particular and

tion of the problem of Palestine. and underwritten

HE question of policing Palesting a force or men adequate in tained? Here are a few quite tennumbers, armament and discipline, tative but, I think, realistic sugwho are willing to take on the gestions. job and are controlled by loyalties that will keep them impartially to the discharge of their duty; and duty in the British-occupied zone then providing an authority by which this force can be controlled and directed.

than done, however.

mand and responsibility. It is Continued on Page 7, Column 2. al

ried out 100 per cent. But this if any other great power were to will almost certainly be the guid- propose sending its forces into ing principle of the British evac- Palestine, it would be hard indeed uation plan: To hold the balance to prevent the Soviet Union from claiming the right to participate, You can hear all sorts of ac- too, and the presence of Soviet cusations and prophecies of "dirty troops in the Middle East could hardly be regarded as an unmixed blessing, to put it mildly, either by London or Washington.

So if we must have national forces (and I can see no other ish evacuation was made; and practicable possibility) they are likely to be sought, aside from any heard scarcely a single respon- possible British contingent, from the smaller powers.

Would any smaller powers be willing to take on such a job? And if they would, do any of them $| \mathbf{r} |$ But that does not solve the have armies sufficiently strong problem of who is going to keep and well equipped to furnish the peace in Palestine when the contingents of the necessary

The answer to the latter quesconjectural, and rests upon sev-My own guess would be that the eral contingencies, of which the British will stick to what they question of finance is perhaps of have already said—that they will first importance. If the United not bear alone the burden of enforcing in Palestine a United Nations were willing to tions settlement which is not ac- contribute their share of the cost, ceptable to both Jews and Arabs: then it might be possible to find t

HERE are several of the t smaller powers whose armies might furnish contingents adequate in size and character for a security force in Palestine, providas a loyal member of the United ing the question of cost could be handled by means of a general contribution by the great powers.

Certain rules surely would have of this heavy and thankless task? to be laid down. First, the offi-It is all very well to say that Palestine will be temporarily advolunteers. Second, only fully trained officers and men could be accepted. Raw recruits would be worse than useless. Third, each Here is the very core and center of all hope of a reasonable solution of the problem of Palestine.

Possibility in Small Powers. This somewhat narrows the area tine during the "adjustment" of choice. Specifically, then, period is just a question of get- where could such a force be ob-

Both Norway and Denmark have at present a brigade of about 5000 men engaged in occupation of Germany. These men are volunteers, not conscripts. They are fully trained and armed with This is much more easily said British weapons, which would be a decided advantage if Britain The British Army, which has were participating. Granted suitbeen trying to keep order in Pal- able inducements, as above sugestine for 27 years and more, has gested, it seems quite possible that the its own inherent character, loy-alties, traditions, chain of com-

full authority to move units of the force wherever they might be required in Palestine.

Size of Security Force. The size of the force would not need to parallel the present British strength of almost 100,000. Probably 25,000 would be ample: perhaps less. From the military viewpoint, the plan is feasible. Whether it is possible politically rests with the nations that can make it so if they are willing.

It may be noted that it has been the constant aim of the lesser states to strengthen their power and influence within the United Nations structure. How better this could be done than by the acceptance of such a responsibility as above suggested is difficult to imagine.

At any rate, if the peace is to be kept in Palestine during the interim period between the British withdrawal and the establishment of self-contained Jewish and Arab states as going concerns presuming always that the General Assembly decides on a scheme of partition—it is certainly going to require the initial support of some kind of security force from outside the country.

In the search for means to accomplish this necessary purpose, more and more thought is being given to the possibility of using the forces of some of the smaller Powers.

BRITISH EMBASSY.

WASHINGTON 8, D. C.

22nd November 1947

Ref: 1275/74/47 CONFIDENTIAL 8 NOV

Dear Department,

We are enclosing herein a copy of a State Department press release giving the text of an address by Mr. Armour at a dinner sponsored by the Arab American Institute in New York on November 20th. You will see that Mr. Armour made a strong plea that Arab-American friendship should not be affected by the divergency of views upon Palestine.

- Balfour saw Armour shortly afterwards. Armour told him that most of the Arab speakers at the dinner criticised the United States in no uncertain terms and the Syrian representative told him that although the United States seemed to derive satisfaction from the fact that an accord had been reached with the Soviet Union, the latter was playing its own game and was trying to get Communist agents into Palestine as \ immigrants from the Black Sea area. (Compare Damascus telegram to Foreign Office No.38 Saving of 5th November).
- Mr. Armour gained the impression that the Arabs took it for granted that partition would be approved by the United Nations and that they would then do their best to see that it should not be carried into effect. They might indeed resort to arms for this purpose. The Emir Faisal made a good impression on Armour, as he appeared dignified and sincere, but another Arab delegate came up to him after the dinner and told him that his remarks were all "tommy rot".

We are sending a copy of this letter to Jerusalem and to the U.K. Delegation at New York.

Eastern Department, Foreign Office, London, S.W.1.

Yours ever,

CHANCERY

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FOR THE PRESS

NOVEMBER 20, 1947 NO. 921

CONFIDENTIAL **FUTURE RELEASE** NOTE DATE

CONFIDENTIAL RELEASE FOR PUBLICATION AT 7:00 P.M., E.S.T., THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 1947. NOT TO BE PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED, QUOTED FROM OR USED IN ANY WAY.

ADDRESS BY THE HONORABLE NORMAN ARMOUR, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, AT A DINNER SPONSORED BY THE ARAB AMERICAN INSTITUTE, AT THE HOTEL PENNSYLVANIA, NEW YORK CITY, ON THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 1947, AT 7 P.M.

Mr. Chairman, Your Royal Highnesses, Honorable Delegates, members and guests of the Arab American Institute and of the Arab-speaking community.

I count it a very real and timely privilege, Mr. Chairman, to join with your Institute in honoring the distinguished members of the Arab countries! delegations to the second General Assembly of the United Nations.

Although I myself have not had the good fortune to serve in "The Arab Island", I have, as all of us have, felt the impact of its culture on all people. During my years in Spain I had an opportunity to see tangible examples of that culture.

I have visited the great Mosque at Cordoba, seen the silk factories which result from the introduction of the silk worm to Spain by the Moslems, and know that the widespread agricultural development of the southeastern plain is one of the Arabs' lasting gifts to that peninsula.

I have read, over the collegiate portals in Moslem Spain: "The world is supported by four things only: the learning of the wise, the justice of the great, the prayers of the righteous, and the valor of the brave."

The state of the state of I have come to know that the Arabs and we of the Western World have much in common. Our views of democracy and equality and those of the Arab are very similar.

Control of Marie Maria Control To turn now to what may seem from earlier speeches to be the business of the evening.

I have read, with care and with real interest, your Institute's current Bulletin and the letter inviting General Marshall to be among your speakers tonight. You know he has left for London. As his substitute, I shall speak frankly.

Your invitation reaffirmed the Institute's chartered purpose: "To promote Arab-American friendship and under-And I relendship, and u

standing

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standing". It continues: "If Arab-American friendship needed cultivation in the past, it is more urgent in the present circumstances. We, as Americans, wish to redouble our efforts."

That objective, Arab-American friendship, is likewise a fundamental objective of the American Government. And we in Washington, where American policies are formulated through the democratic process, would be the first to expect and approve a redoubling of effort on the part of all loyal American citizens of Arab background--to achieve it, in these present or any circumstances.

What, in the words of the Institute's Bulletin, are these present circumstances? First, you are urged to attend this dinner to honor the distinguished Arab delegates to the United Nations Assembly. And you are exhorted "to stand up and be counted".

For what particular cause are you asked so to stand? Your Bulletin answers: For the right of the Arabs of Palestine to "undisturbed possession of their country". Consequently, the Bulletin argues, you should oppose the primary objective of political Zionism, namely, the establishment of an independent Jewish state in Palestine.

The argument then narrows to a conclusion. I paraphrase and perhaps over-simplify: As Partition of Palestine would, if achieved, result in the establishment of such a state, you should oppose Partition.

In the few minutes at my disposal, I do not propose to review the history of the Palestine Problem or the deplorable state to which a land equally holy to Moslem, Christian and Jew has been brought by the interplay of opposing political and social forces.

It would, in fact, be improper for me to do so; for that problem is now properly <u>sub judice</u> before the bar of world opinion democratically personified in the membership of the United Nations Assembly.

I can, however, tell you what the American Government's studied opinion is. It is that this problem is international, in law and in fact, and that the settlement of it must be found on the international plane, by the United Nations, in accordance with the principles and procedures of the San Francisco Charter.

The American Government believes that a just and workable settlement can be found by that organization. The basic principles and objectives of its Charter and of American foreign policy are the same.

Now, let me, in turn, as did your Bulletin, narrow my remarks to Partition. The majority of the eleven members of

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of the United Nations special committee which reviewed the entire problem last summer took the position that the United Nations could find, within the framework of the concept of Partition, a just and workable settlement. To the careful studies and report of the committee, the United States, in Secretary Marshall's words, lends "great weight." Consequently, during the current debates at Lake Success, we have been endeavoring to contribute to the elaboration of the details of a just and workable plan of Partition.

It is now for the Assembly, sitting in plenary session, to decide whether the American and other like-minded delegations have succeeded in their endeavor. We are not infallible. There are strong opposing views. You have heard much of their essence from other speakers tonight.

This, however, seems common ground: namely, that the problem is before its proper forum. Further, if the view of those governments which believe that Partition is just and workable should be sustained by resolution of the Assembly, a notable contribution to the solution of one of our most thorny problems will have been made. On the other hand, if the General Assembly does not recommend a Partition plan, we shall, of course, accept its decision and continue our support of the principles and processes of that forum.

In any event, we confidently believe, the United Nations may continue to count on the sincere good counsel and helpful cooperation of all its members.

Those in Washington who have to do with the formulation of American foreign policy would count it a tragic, even disastrous loss were the foundations of Arab-American friendship to be affected as a result of divergency of views thus far advanced on this immensely moving problem of the future of our common Holy Land. And I am sure you loyal Americans of Arab background share this view.

I cannot emphasize too strongly that the position which the Government of the United States has taken with regard to Palestine does not indicate lack of friendship or consideration for the Arab world. That position was taken after careful consideration of all sides of the question, with particular reference to the report and recommendations of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine.

The foundations of Arab-American friendship to which I referred have been well laid during the course of more than a century, by Arabs as well as by Americans. In this modern world, where economic and cultural exchange is a new password to sound international relationships, those foundations are a priceless legacy.

Surely on that legacy we can, through joint endeavor, build a great structure of achievement to our common benefit. I sometimes feel that destiny has called upon us to do so. America has lost neither the spirit nor the constructive urge of its pioneering beginnings. The Arab world, stirred by the vital force of enlightened nationalisms, has already passed the threshold of a new renaissance.

There

There is much to be done in the economic and social fields as well as on the plane of international politics, to realize the bright visions of that renaissance. No country more than the United States has welcomed the Arab States to full and equal membership in the family of nations. We stand now as in the past ready to cooperate with those States in realizing the great projects so ably conceived by the leaders of their renaissance.

Joint cooperation will result in mutual understanding. Therein our common goal will be attained.

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(Fro United Kingdom Delegation to United White

Mo. 3550.

D. 5.23 p.m. 97th Movember, 1927.

27th Movember, 1947.

n. 10.45 p.m. 27th Hovember, 1947.

I I EDIAT ..

Your telegran No. 4121.

Two copies of report of Sub-Conmittee One in form Two copies of report of Sub-Conmittee One in form presented to Ad Moc Committee on 19th Movember were sent to Mathieson (Colonial Office) by air bag which left here on the Soth Movember and five additional copies on the 21st Movember. The additional report of the Sub-Committee which was subsitted on the 22nd Movember revised Part 1 of the original report as detailed in my telegrams 5498 and 5507. Copies of this additional report were sent by air bag to the Colonial Office. The only amendments of substance subsequently adopted by the Md Moc Committee are given in my telegrams 5528, 5555, 5556 and 5538. Two copies of the report of the Md Moc Committee to the Assembly have been sent to Mathieson today by air.


2. Complete text of paragraph 5 of chapter two of Section C of Part 1 is as follows.

"5. Except as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government, no measure shall be taken to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of religious or charitable bodies of all faiths or to discriminate a ainst any representative or member of these bodies on the ground of his religion or mationality."

3. Paragraphs 2-6 of this charter of the UNSCOP report were re-numbered 4-8 in the report of the Sub-Counittee.

with reference to (8) of my telegram 3535 see paragraph 8 of my telegram 3425 which gives the text of the second paragraph of Section E as finally adopted by Sub-Committee One.

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OUTWARD TELEGRAM

En Clair

DEPARTMENTAL NO.1.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK


(To United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 4145

D. 12.15 a.m. 29th November 1947

28th Nevember 1947

Your telegram No. 3552 [of November 27th: Palestine]. Please send by fast airbag two copies of final text of recommendations, as voted on by Assembly. CCC



OUT FILE

(E 11206/951/31)

RESTRICTED .

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

2nd December, 1947.

Dear Delegation,

Thank you for your telegram No. 3552 about Sub-Committee One's amendments to the United Nations Sub-Committee on Palestine majority recommendations for the partition of Palestine.

2. We have now been able to clear up such ambiguities as remained by reference to the reports sent by you to the Colonial Office. It would, however, have saved time and trouble if we had received copies of the reports direct from you, which is what we should normally have expected.

Yours ever. EASTERN DEPARTMENT.

United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations, New York.

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| 1 2 3 4 5 6 | Reference:- | 61890 | 371 / 61890



UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION TO THE UNITED NATIONS EMPIRE STATE BUILDING NEW YORK 1, N. Y.

TELEPHONE: LONGACRE 5-2070

1/206 951 ?] , 5th De

REPLIES SHOULD BE ADDRESSED P. O. Box 304 New York 1, N. Y.

5th December, 1947.

Nº 52/605/47

Dear Department,

Please refer to your letter E 11206/951/31 of 2nd December.

Fifteen copies of reports and working papers of the Sub-Committee on Palestine and its sub-committees were sent to the Foreign Office by air bag immediately on receipt for use by departments concerned. Copies which McGillivray sent to Mathieson, as reported in Delegation telegram No. 3552 of 27th November, were extra.

Yours ever,

DELEGATION.

Eastern Department, Foreign Office, London, S.W.1. Reference:-

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1947	PALESTINE	28 NOV
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En clair

WORLD ORGANIS ZEONOVSTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

D. 5.32 p.m. November 27th, 1947. No. 3553

November 27th, 1947. R. 11.05 p.m. November 27th, 1947.

Repeated to Jerusalem and Saving to Washington.

IMMEDIATE

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 3553 of November 27th repeated to Jerusalem and Saving to ashington.

My telegram No. 3532.

Palestine.

There were ten speakers at yesterday morning's meeting of the Plenary Session.

- 2. Sweden while regretting that the proposals for implementation of the plan were so inadequate expressed the opinion that it would be worse to have no decision than a defective one they would therefore vote for partition. The delegate stressed the special need for early action in respect of lawselem the appearance of lawselement and appearance of la in respect of Jerusalem, the appointment of a Governor and the recruitment of a special gendarmerie for the City.
- categorically that he would vote against partition said that his country could not support any proposal for the political dismemberment of Palestine since this would not be in accord with the fundamental principles of the Charter.
- 4. The Canadian delegate (Ilsley) said that his Government considered partition to be the best of difficult and unattractive alternatives and would support it with misgivings. He expressed the hope that once definite action had been taken there would be a change of heart.
- 5. Greece stated that she would vote against partition on the grounds that its implementation would create greater disturbance than if ne decision were taken.
- 6. Brazil while in favour of a unitary form of Government in principle was prepared to accept partition as a temperary measure as a means towards ultimate unity.
- 7. Here followed the statement of the United Kingdom delegate reported in full in my telegram No. 3549.
- 8. Herschel Johnson expressing the view of his Government that the report of the Ad Hoc Committee presented the best practical opportunity for a peaceful settlement said that, with the co-operation of the present Government of Palestine and of the peoples of Palestine, it would bring about a solution. No plan he said could be effected "without the use of the knife". The plan of the Committee had undoubted authority under Articles 10 and 14 of the Charter. As regards the appointment of a

/Commission

 $\boldsymbol{\alpha}$ 90

Commission no one would question the authority of the Assembly to do this under Article 22. The chief objection raised against this Commission had been on the grounds that it would have to take certain administrative steps but would have no legal authority for this. He contended however that there could be no question of the right of the United Nations to give temporary and transitory assistance in this way to enable peoples to establish themselves as free and independent peoples.

9. The Egyptian representative drew attention to the fact that the resolution was one recommending "the adoption and implementation" of a plan of partition to the United Kingdom and to all other members of the United Nations. Yet the United Kingdom had made it clear that she was not prepared to implement such a plan and the vote in the Ad Hoc Committee had shown that only 25 out of 57 nations were prepared to stomach the violation of the principles of the Charter which the plan intended. Moreover the Danish amendment had made it clear that even some of these 25 nations were doubtful as to the legality of what they had supported. The Egyptian Government would take the resolution, if passed, for what it was, a mere recommendation addressed to them. Egypt did not however consider that the General Assembly was competent to make this recommendation and in any case would not adopt it. They still demanded that the question of the competence of the General Assembly should be referred to the International Court of Justice, and until it was so the International Court of Justice, and until it was so referred, would be guided only by their own interpretation of powers under the Charter.

10. Yenen and Persia also spoke rejecting partition on the grounds that it was incompatible with the principles of the Charter.

Foreign Office please pass Immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 246.

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section, Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem]

₽_m

I attach a draft reply which the Colonial Office propose to send to the Message addressed to them by Mr. Martin in New York, telegram No. 3551. It will be seen that this reply agrees to an arrangement by which Mr. Gibson of the Palestine administration abould go to New York in order to co-operate with the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations in working out a statute for the international city of Jerusalem.

The loan of Mr. Gibson for this purpose involves us in a certain degree of responsibility in regard to the setting up of an international régime in Jerusalem but this responsibility can hardly be avoided in view of the exceptional experience we have of Palestinian questions and the particularly complicated religious questions arising in Jerusalem. Sir A. Cadogan has already agreed in principle to our helping the Trusteeship Council and we Stand therefore, concur in the attached Colonial Office telegram.

B. s. Buins

(J. G. S. Beith) 2nd December, 1947.

Nothing to be Written in this

371 / 61890

11213

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Cypher/OTP.

28 NOV

DEPARTMENTAL NO. 1.

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3551.

D. 2.38 p.m. 27th November, 1947. R. 9.15 p.m. 27th November, 1947.

27th November, 1947.

Repeated to Jerusalem,
Washington - Saving.

IMPORTANT.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram 3551 November 27th, repeated Jerusalem and Saving to Washington.

Following for Lloyd Colonial Office from Martin.

MacGillivray leaves for Jamaica 7th December arriving 15th. He is informing Governor direct.

2. If proposals regarding city of Jerusalem are adopted (either as part of recommendations submitted by ad hoc Committee, or separately, as certain delegations will propose if Committee's recommendations do not obtain necessary two-thirds majority) Trusteeship Council will be charged with the elaboration of "a detailed statute of the city". Understand that intention of chairman of Council is that a committee should be appointed at once for this purpose and Secretariat have already made progress with preliminary studies. Burns agrees that in that event it will be essential to have an expert from Palestine to advise and assist and it is important that he should be here from the start of the discussions. Gibson seems obviously best qualified if he could be spared, particularly since constitutional and legal issues are likely to present greatest difficulties.


Chairman of Trusteeship Council that United Kingdom should be represented on Committee referred to above. Cadogan agreed that we could not well refuse this measure of co-operation.

Foreign Office please pass important to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 245.

[Copies sent to Colonial Office for Lloyd and for repetition to Jerusalem].

5 6 Reference:-FO 371/61890

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pending departure for New york o kn light of developments please telegraph Uhen discussions are likely to begin and of Wetter arrangements should be made for earlist air passage to New york of twould also be useful to know if there are any particular aspects of the problem on which se skould be briefed.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

OUT TILE

Confidential Cypher CTP

DEPARTMENTAL No. 1

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK

(Te United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 4186
3rd December 1947. D. 3.30 p.m. 3rd December 1947.

Repeated to Jerusalem
Washington No. 12472

IMEDIATE CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to New York (Del.) telegram No. 4186 of 3rd December, repeated for information to Jerusalem and Washington.

Your telegram No. 3551 [of 27th November: Palestine].

Fellowing for Martin from Trafford Smith Colonial Office.

High Commissioner has agreed that Gibson should be made available to advise and assist in Trusteeship Council work on Jerusalem. He cannot however be spared beyond end of December. He has accordingly cancelled his return to Palestine and is undertaking preliminary study of Jerusalem question pending departure for New York. In light of developments please telegraph when discussions are likely to begin and whether arrangements should be made for carliest air passage to New York. It would also be useful to know if there are any particular aspects of the problem on which he should be briefed.

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INWARD TELEGRAM

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES

E11213/951/31

Cypher (O.T.P.)

MUERED

FROM PALESTINE (Gen. Sir A. Cunningham)

D. 29th November, 1947 R. 29th "

09.50 hrs.

MOST IMMEDIATE

No. 2281. Secret

Addressed to the S. of S.
Repeated to Washington No. 272 (Washington
please pass to UKDEL New York as
my telegram No. 1644).

Your telegram No. 3044 and New York telegram to Foreign Office No. 3551. Begins.

City of Jeruselem.

In view of importance of assignment I would not resist your proposal regarding Gibson. We must, however, have as soon as possible the results of his discussions with you. We can then proceed with initiating drafting of local withdrawal legislation, but I feel that he should be back here before it is enacted. It would suit us to have him back here by the end of December.

Copies sent to:-

Foreign Office

- Mr. J.G.S. Beith.

INWARD TELEGRAM

Din . 81

TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE COLONIES

Cypher (O.T.P.)

FROM PALESTINE (Gen. Sir A. Cunningham)

D. 29th November, 1947

R. 29th "

09.50 hrs.

MOST IMMEDIATE

No. 2281. Secret

Addressed to the S. of S.
Repeated to Washington No. 272 (Washington please pass to UKDEL New York as my telegram No. 1644).

Your telegram No. 3044 and New York telegram to Foreign Office No. 3551. Begins.

City of Jerusalem.


In view of importance of assignment I would not resist your proposal regarding Gibson. We must, however, have as soon as possible the results of his discussions with you. We can then proceed with initiating drafting of local withdrawal legislation, but I feel that he should be back here before it is enacted. It would suit us to have him back here by the end of December.

Copies sent to:-

Foreign Office

- Mr. J.G.S. Beith.

371 / 61890



WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to the United Nations)

No. 3554

D. 5.47 p.m. 27th November,

27th November, 1947. Repeated to Jerusalem

R.11.25 p.m. 27th November,

Washington Saving

IMEDIATE

GIANT

28 NOV

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 3554 of November 27th repeated to Jerusalem and Saving to Washington.

My telegram No. 3553.

Palestine.

At the afternoon session on the 26th November Lange (Poland) described Palestine as a police state in which the press was under censorship and no civil rights existed. He commended His Majesty's Government's action in bringing the question before the United Nations and expressed the hope that they would continue to co-operate.

2. This was followed by three Arab speeches. Feisal appealed for justice saying that if it were not granted by the United Nations the states concerned must defend it by themselves. Adil Arslan attributed Polish support for a Jewish state to the desire of the Polish Government to get rid of its own Jewish population. As for the United States, they were fighting Communism from Hollywood to the borders of Manchuria but they appeared not to mind if half a million Communists descended on Palestine

from the harbours of the Black Sea. He hoped the American people would demand the independence of their foreign policy from Zionist influence. Chamoun delivered a fiery speech in which he condemned American influence in the Assembly as a "dark and obscure tyranny". The Soviet delegation supported the Jewish claim for independence in accordance with a peculiar interpretation of the doctrine of self determination. But this doctrine so interpreted could next be applied to the Arab minority in the proposed Jewish state. Chamoun then read a newspaper report suggesting that the Russians were now applying the same doctrine to Azerbaijan. If a Jewish state were created on this basis no country with minorities would be safe from disruption.

- 3. Fabregat (Uruguay) delivered his customery speech on the fate of the Jews in Europe and the surviving 30,000 children. Vieux (Haiti) edged away from his previous support for the principle of partition and finally stated that since the concrete proposals now made were not satisfactory he would vote against them.
- Sassen (Netherlands) criticised the non co-operative attitude of the Arabs. Their case was strong but not so strong as that of the Jews. For the Assembly to adopt a resolution would not necessarily be a success.

/The solution !

The solution should be a fair one. He was inclined to think that the positive results of the debate on means of implementation were insignificant, a failure which was not due to the small powers. Nevertheless his delegation would vote for partition in the hope that the provisions for economic union would eventually bring the two peeples closer together.

- 5. Berendsen (New Zealand) also criticised the inadequacy of the proposals for enforcement. The United Nations should assume the duty of protecting the population of Palestine against the trouble which might result from their recommendations and should prepare themselves to do so. At the same time he preferred the present proposal with all its defects to the absence of any decision and would vote for it.
- 6. Gromyko dissented from the opinion of the Arab delegates that partition would be contrary to Arab interests. Those delegates were not identified with the true feeling of the Arab peoples, who would often have occasion to look towards Moscow when they struggled for their lawful interests, in particular for liberation from the vestiges of colonialism. The United Kingdom Government had not given the United Nations the support they were entitled to expect. They had acted correctly in bringing the question before the United Nations, but their submission of it had been accompanied by many reservations, the nature of which showed that they had no desire to co-operate in finding a solution for the Palestine problem. Their attitude was tantamount to a prior declaration that they would not be bound by a recommendation of the General Assembly. He concluded by calling upon those states which had hitherto abstained to cast positive votes.
- 7. Langenhove (Belgium) stated that he would vote for partition, in the conviction that the permanent members of the Security Council had counted the possible consequences and that the Security Council would take the necessary measures if trouble ensued.

Foreign Office please pass Immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 247.

[Copy sent to Telegraph Section, Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem.]

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TO 371 / 61890

INWARD TELEGRAM

8 89

Cypher (O.T.P.)

28 NOV

FROM PALESTINE (General Sir A. Cunningham)

TO S. OF S. COLONIES.

D. 26th November, 1947. R. 26th " 13.25 hrs.

MOST IMMEDIATE

No. 2262 Top Secret.

Addressed U.K.D.E.L. New York No. 1362.
Repeated to the S. of S. (Please pass to U.K.D.E.L.)
Washington No. 270.

11804

Further to my telegram No. 2251 regarding Jerusalem. Today press reports that scheme described in your telegram No. 3492 to Foreign Office has been amended so as to provide

- (a) that the city shall be perpetually under an international regime;
- (b) for deletion of clause which would have permitted eitizens of Jerusalem by a two thirds majority to vote for a new regime in ten years time. There, is, however, said to be new provision that the people of Jerusalem may vote after ten years on possible modifications in administration.

2. I think that you should know that all indications here go to show that the Jews will do their utmost to obtain control of the city. Fairly reliable information indicates that they have already made plans for transfer to Jerusalem of 50,000 workers and Rokach has stated that Tel Aviv could never claim to be the capital of the Jewish state, a privilege reserved for Jerusalem. If amendments referred to in the first paragraph have in fact been made, chief danger that the city may be absorbed by Jewish state has been averted but you may wish to take suitable occasion to ensure that provision about referendum on administration matters is so framed as to preclude

possibility/

RECEIVED IN C.B. 27 NOV 1947 possibility that it may be used to permit achievement of Jewish aims to make Jerusalem a Jewish city. 3. From the angle of Christendom, the worst that could happen to Jerusalem would be that it should come under Jewish control. (Copies sent to Foreign Office for transmission to U.K.D.E.L.) Distributed to:-R. 243 Mr. Martin Secretary of State Mr. Trafford Smith Sir T. Lloyd Mr. Rees-Williams Mr. Gutch Mr. Mathieson Sir S. Caine Mr. Highem Mr. Gelsworthy Mr. Holmer Sir C. Jeffries Mr. Holding Mr. Gibson Mr. Dale Foreign Office Mr. Boith. Mr. Burrows. Cabinet Offices Mr. S.E.V. Luke. Commander Evershed. Ministry of Defence Brigadier Cornwell-Jones

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Cypher/OTP

DEPARTMENTAL NO.1.

FROM DAMASCUS TO FOREIGN OFFICE 28 NOV

Mr. Dundas No. 529

D. 12.44 p.m. November 28th, 1947.

Nevember 28th, 1947.

R. 12.59 p.m. November 28th, 1947.

Repeated to Arab posts Saving.

MOST IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed Foreign Office No. 529, November 28th, repeated to Arab posts Saving.


The Syrian Prime Minister this morning sent for me and said that United Nations voting on partition of Palestine appeared to be likely to be decided by an odd vote or two. On behalf of the Syrian Government he asked his Majesty's Government as a friend of the Arabs to vote against partition and to use their influence to persuade waverers to do the same.

2. I gave him no hope that His Majesty's Government would abandon their intention of abstaining but said that I would pass his message to you.

Please repeat to United Kingdom Delegation New York as my telegram No. 14 Most Immediate.

[Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York]

SSSSS



[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

Cypher/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM CAIRO TO FOREIGN OFFICE

28 NOV

Sir R Campbell

D. 7. 07 p.m. 27th November, 1947.

No. 2229 27th November, 1947.

R. 7. 21 p.m. 27th November, 1947.

Repeated to Beirut Saving
Damascus Saving
Amman Saving
Jedda Saving
Jerusalem Saving

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2229 of November 27th repeated saving to Beirut Damascus Amman Jedda Jerusalem.

Your telegram No. 2131: Palestine,

I have no definite information about the existence of an Arab Higher Command and enquiries have so far produced negative results.

- 2. On November 20th a local newspaper published a French Press Agency report from Damascus dated November 19th stating that at an extraordinary meeting of the Syrian Cabinet held in the presence of Fawzi El Kawakji, Taha El Hashemi Pasha, Izzet Darwaza and Moine El Maki, the execution of secret decisions of the Arab League Council was discussed. The report adds that after the above meeting Jamil Mardam stated: "We have got into contact with the Arab Government with a view to facing any surprises".
- Reported presence of the above named persons at that meeting may of course be connected with projected guerilla activities rather than action by regular military forces. There has been some talk of a military committee to supervise irregular guerilla forces.

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E 96

26 NOV 1947

tab.

* 23. Mr. Janner,—To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whether His Majesty's Government is in a position to announce the date of the termination of the Mandate for Palestine. [Wednesday 26th November.]

that food Leicester W.

ANSWERCO 26 NOV 1947
REPLY AT CACHED.

' 11242 29 N and the Chiefs of State and the Chiefs of State are averse to Stating a date for the termination of the Mandate at present we feel that it may be necessary to end the mandate fairly soon for profit ical mandate fairly soon for mandate fairly soon for mandate for the fairly for a hor Commission is appointed but agree that we cannot be emissive down yet.


I submit a draft

F47. (Buins Nov. 25 (BEITH)

JABRUMON 25.11

reply in which Co Coneur

MTV25. N



PALESTINE MANDATE

State for Foreign Affairs whether His Majesty's Government is in a position to announce the date of the termination of the Mandate for Palestine.

Mr. Mayhew: No; but failing a solution of the Palestine problem agreed by the Jews and Arabs, the Mandate will be surrendered before 1st August, the date for which the final withdrawal of British troops is planned.

26 NOV 1947

DRAFT REPLY

to:

Mr. B. JANNER No.23. November 26th

Co. Coneur

(rm 25/2,

planned.

NOTE FOR SUPPLEMENTARIES.

No, Sir;

A decision on the date for terminating the Mandate is bound up with details of the withdrawal of British troops and cannot be settled.

Mile 25.11

I have better have a lake with someone about to tales Palesia Louisia.

Com 25/x1

date for the termination of the

-Mandate but, failing a solution of the

Palestine problem agreed by the Jews and

before August Ist, the date for which the

Arabs, the Mandate will be surrendered

final withdrawal of British troops is

VOTES OF COMMONWEALTH COUNTRIES ON PALESTINE.

South Africa is almost certain to vote for the majority (partition) plan on Palestine.

Australia has told us nothing about her final attitude but it is possible that, in view of Doctor Evatt's chairmanship of the ad hoc Committee, she may abstain. She signed the major to Report and to Myorike nor the textent is committed to support it. Without the Myorike nor the

The Canadian representative has been taking an Mingrely metal active part in the Committee work on the majority plan and may therefore vote for it.

The New Zealand Prime Minister has told us that his Government feel that they must support partition, but the New Zealand representive is reported as having said at Lake Success on November 22nd that he could not vote for the plan "which did not provide for orderly implementation and the protection of the population in Palestine from wide-spread strife". (The Times).

Pakistan is committed to support the Arabs and vote against partition, while India is likely to do so too (she signed the minority (unitary Plate) Report.

It is for consideration whether the Secretary of State, in the course of conversation with Mr. Mackenzie King, might wish to ask him how Canada is going to vote and say that we propose either to abstain er to vote against. (Soo minute submitted senarately).

Too late

24th November, 1947.

Millswight

question. EB. 26/11]

BB/ 27.11

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En Clair

GENERAL DISTRIBUTION

FROM MOSCOW TO FOREIGN OFFEE.

Sir M. Peterson.

D. 12.45.p.m. November 28th, 1947.

No. 2552. November 28th, 1947.

R. 2.10.p.m. November 28th, 1947.

Repeated to U.K. Delegation New York No. 111.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 2552 of 28th November repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York No. 111.

Soviet press on United Nations debate on Palestine.

Long New York Tass report dated November 24th and carried in press of 27th outlines present position in United Nations discussion of Palestine, and in section headlined "Manoeuvres of the British delegation" alleges that "British representatives have adopted a very evasive and equivocal attitude".

- 2. Despite Creech-Jones' noble assurances that the British Government was in considerable agreement with the Fact-finding Commission's recommendations and was prepared to surrender its mandate, he had later declared that if both sides were not in agreement the British Government would not feel able to carry out the decisions. This statement was regarded in Assembly circles as a manoeuvre designed to disrupt the decision of Palestine question.
- 3. When the ground had been cut from beneath the British delegation's feet by the Soviet proposals of November 3rd, it had had recourse to new wiles, While repeating former assurances Sir A. Cadegan on November 20th had hinted at the risk of armed conflict in the transitional period and had uttered the threat, that the British Government would lay down its mandate without waiting for the formation of the mechanism necessary to carry the decision to form two independent States in Palestine.

Foreign Office please pass to United Kingdom Delegation New York as my telegram No. 111.

[Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York.]

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A S 6 Reference:- F 6 Reference:- F 6 371 / 61890

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29 IOV

En Clair

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION.

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3557.

D. 8.48 p.m. 28th November, 1947.

28th November, 1947.

R. 6.55 a.m. 29th November, 1947.

IMMEDIATE.
GIANT.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 3557, 28/11, repeated Jerusalem and Saving to Washington.

My telegram No. 3554. 11212 /957/71

This morning's plenary session opened with an impressive speech by Zafrullah Khan in which he criticised the partition plan for its lack of equity and juridical support, its unworkability and its failure to tackle the humanitarian aspect of the problem along the lines of the sixth unanimous recommendation of U.N.S.C.O.P. He declared that there could no longer be doubt that behind-the-scenes activities were influencing the vote, and appealed to the Assembly to allow room for the exercise of henest judgment and decision when problems of such importance to world stability came before it. He deplored the procedure which had been adopted in the appointment of two sub-committees each consisting exclusively of partisans and recalled that sub-committee two had endeavoured in vain to obtain a change in its composition. He also deplored the fact that no real effort had been made by the United Nations to bring Arabs and Jews together and to find "a middle way" and suggested that there was still an opportunity for a solution which would have a chance of acceptance by both the parties concerned.

- 2. The delegate of China also deplored the fact that two sub-committees had been so constituted that their reports had inevitably put forward diametrically opposed views and that there had been no greater endeavour at reconciliation. His delegation could not give positive support to the draft resolution in its present form and would abstain from voting.
- 3. The Arab delegates walked out as the delegate of Guatemala began a speech in which he gave an account of the "hostility" shown by the Arab Higher Committee to the U.N.S.C.O.P. during that Committee's investigations in Palestine and said that, despite attempts to keep them from hearing the Arabs, the members of U.N.S.C.O.P. had seen enough to convince them of Arab hatred for the Jews and of the impossibility of reconciliation and friendship.
- 4. The delegate of Cuba indicated that his delegation would vote against partition on the grounds that it prejudiced the rights of non-Jewish communities in Palestine and was therefore contrary to the Balfour

declaration/

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29 IOV

En Clair

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION.

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3557.

D. 8.48 p.m. 28th November, 1947.

28th November, 1947. R. 6.55 a.m. 29th November, 1947.

IMMEDIATE.

GIANT.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 3557, 28/11, repeated Jerusalem and Saving to Washington.

My telegram No. 3554. 11212/ /957/5/

This morning's plenary session opened with an impressive speech by Zafrullah Khan in which he criticised the partition plan for its lack of equity and juridical support, its unworkability and its failure to tackle the humanitarian aspect of the problem along the lines of the sixth unanimous recommendation of U.N.S.C.O.P. He declared that there could no longer be doubt that behind-the-scenes activities were influencing the vote, and appealed to the Assembly to allow room for the exercise of honest judgment and decision when problems of such importance to world stability came before it. He deplored the procedure which had been adopted in the appointment of two sub-committees each consisting exclusively of partisans and recalled that sub-committee two had endeavoured in vain to obtain a change in its composition. He also deplored the fact that no real effort had been made by the United Mations to bring Arabs and Jews together and to find "a middle way" and suggested that there was still an opportunity for a solution which would have a chance of acceptance by both the parties concerned.

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- 3. The Arab delegates walked out as the delegate of Guatemala began a speech in which he gave an account of the "hostility" shown by the Arab Higher Committee to the U.N.S.C.O.P. during that Committee's investigations in Palestine and said that, despite attempts to keep them from hearing the Arabs, the members of U.N.S.C.O.P. had seen enough to convince them of Arab hatred for the Jews and of the impossibility of reconciliation and friendship.
- 4. The delegate of Cuba indicated that his delegation would vote against partition on the grounds that it prejudiced the rights of non-Jewish communities in Palestine and was therefore contrary to the Balfour

declaration/

declaration and the mandate. He urged that the United Nations should proceed in a democratic manner and consult the will of the whole people of Palestine and should not attempt to impose a plan which was coercive in character. He described the plan as a dangerous one in that it implied the principle that all racial minorities should have the right to break away from their parent countries.

5. The Iraqi delegate (Jamali) criticised the procedure adopted throughout by the United Nations in that first, there had been appointed a commission of enquiry consisting of members, the majority of whom had already made their views known in favour of partition, and that, later, a sub-committee had been formed of members who were confessedly partial, had only taken into consideration the wishes of the Jewish Agency and had not given the least consideration to the Arab point of view. Although the main function of the United Nations was reconciliation, nothing had been done in this direction beyond the despatch of two letters, one to General Marshall and the other to the Emir Feisal. As a result the plan produced had been totally unacceptable to the Arabs and the Assembly was now being led to believe that there was no alternative to it.

Fereign Office please pass Immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 248.

[Advance copy sent to Telegraph Section, Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem].

TO 371 / 61890

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WORID ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3558

D. 8.38 p.m. 28th November, 1947.

28th November, 1947. R. 2.05 a.m. 29th November, 1947.

Repeated to : Jerusalem

Washington - Saving

MOST IMMEDIATE

29 JV

Addressed Foreign Office telegram No. 3558 28 th November; repeated Jerusalem and Saving Washington.

My immediately following telegram.

Text of Haitian declaration follows:

[Begins]

I feel that my position in regard to the question of Palestine should be made clear. In the statement I made last Wednesday I expressed the views that my Government had just forwarded to me in the most formal terms opposing the partition of Palestine. In an equally formal manner contrary instructions were forwarded to me yesterday. Therefore I will undertake the duty to act on the basis of the last instructions as I did carry out the previous one due to the fact that I did not seek to influence the forthcoming of any instructions from my Gevernment.

[Ends]

Fereign Office please pass Immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 249.

[Copy sent to Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem.]

M

111250

[This telegram is of partices are creecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

Cypher/OTP

WORLD ORGANISATION
DISTRIBUTION.

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3559. D. 9.07 p.m. 28th November, 1947. R. 4.35 a.m. 29th November, 1947.

Repeated to Jerusalem and Saving Washington.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

SECRET.

GIANT.

Addressed Foreign Office telegram No. 3559, 28/11, repeated Jerusalem and Saving Washington.

Palestine.

When the Assembly met on the morning of the 28th November a two-thirds vote for partition seemed to be assured. (See for instance the remarkable declaration of the Haitian delegation contained in my immediately preceding telegram).

- 2. We subsequently learned, however, that an unexpected move had been arranged overnight between the French delegation and the Arabs. In accordance with this arrangement Jamali made a speech at the morning session in which he deplored the fact that the Assembly had not seriously explored the possibility of conciliation and indicated that the Arabs were ready to participate in an effort to repair this emission.
- 3. In the afternoon session Parodi drew attention to this passage in Jamali's speech and to a similar suggestion made by Zafrullah Khan. He proposed an adjournment of twenty-four hours with a view to seeing whether any progress was possible in the direction of conciliation. The French were by that time assured of the support of all the West European and Scandinavian delegations.
- 4. Before Paredi spoke the Colombian delegate (also basing himself on the speeches of Jamali and Zafrullah) had moved the more far-reaching resolution contained in my immediately following telegram.
- 5. Paredi's motion was taken first and carried by 25 votes to 15. The Assembly consequently adjourned until 4 p.m. on Saturday.
- 6. At that time the Colombian motion may be pressed to a vote. I assume that you would wish me to make it clear before this vote is taken that our withdrawal will proceed according to plan whatever the Assembly may decide. Baldly stated this might appear to be intended to discourage the Assembly from

adopting/


adopting the proposal which whatever else may be thought of it, at least has the advantage that it would help to delay the arrival of the United Nations Commission until a date convenient to ourselves. On the other hand, if I were to indicate that we are not at present proposing to terminate the mandate before next spring and that chaos therefore need not be anticipated in Palestine before the dates mentioned in paragraph 3 of the Colombian resolution, my statement might influence some delegates to vote in favour of the proposal.

7. I should welcome your most immediate instructions on this point. I assume that you would wish me to abstain from voting.

Foreign Office please pass immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 250.

[Advance copy sent to Telegraph Section, Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem].

3**33**



this world insertably be regarded as an attempt to influence the Assembly's decision on fartition, which we are determined not to do.

In you should therefore make no further statement and you though alstan!

From voting.

29.11

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/OTP

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK

(To United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 4152 29th November, 1947. D. 4.40 p.m. 29th November, 1947

Repeated to Washington No. 12349

Jerusalem

MOST IMMEDIATE CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to United Kingdom Delegation New York telegram No. 4152 of 29th November repeated for information to Washington and Jerusalem.

Your telegram No. 3559 [of November 28th: Palestine].

We have carefully considered developments recorded in your telegram and Colombian resolution in your telegram No. 3560.

- 2. There is no question of our changing our withdrawal plans in the event of these proposals being adopted.
- 3. If we expressed any view on the proposals or made any statement on our withdrawal plans in relation to them this would inevitably be regarded as an attempt to influence the Assembly's decision on partition, which we are determined not to do.
- 4. You should therefore make no further statement and you should abstain from voting.

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WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE (From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No.3560 28th November, 1947 R. 2.06 a.m. 29th November, 1947

D. 8.42 p.m. 28th November, 1947

Repeated to Jerusalem Washington (Saving)

111254

MOST IMMEDIATE GIANT

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No.3560 28th November repeated Jerusalem and Saving to Washington.

My immediately preceding telegram.

Following is text of Colombian Draft Resolution.

The General Assembly resolves

- 1. To give the Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine the character of an interim subsidiary organ of the General Assembly in order to carry on the discussion of the Palestinian question with a view to finding a satisfactory solution of the problem.
- The Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine is hereby specifically authorised
- (a) To take all the steps necessary to try to bring about an agreement between the representatives of the Arab and the Jewish populations of Palestine as to the future Government and political constitution of that country.
- (b) To request if it deems it necessary the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the juridical questions that may arise in connexion with the settlement of this case.
- (c) To study and formulate concrete recommendations as to the manner in which the members of the United Nations may give effect to unanimous recommendations VI and XII of the United Nations special committee on Palestine.
- 3. The Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine shall report on its work to the Secretary General not later than 29th February 1948. The Secretary General shall forward immediately the report to the member states which shall advise him not later than 15th April 1948 whether they wish to consider the matter in a special session of the General Assembly to be convened at the earliest practicable date thereafter.

Foreign Office please pass immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 251.

[Copy sent to Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem].

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Reference:- FO 371/61890

Telegram. (Date)...Repeat to: Bagdad Beirut Jedda Cairo WRITTEN New York Washington Jerusalem Eix Clair. Cypher. Distribution :— Cabinet

Registry No.

Top Secret. Secret. Confidential. Restricted.

Open.

B. A. B. B.

Draft. Damascus.

Copies to:

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Sin O Sugart.

F. O.,

November 194 7.

Despatched

M.

IMMEDIATE

My telegram No. [of December Palestine '.

In making the communication prescribed in my telegram under reference to the Syrian Government, you may think it desirable to tell them that their appeals (reported in your telegrams Nos. 529 and 531 should adopt a more active attitude against partition were carefully considered by H.M.G. They came to the conclusion that, much as they valued the friendship of the Arab countries it would not be compatible with their position as mandatory and with the consistent attitude of impartiality which they had adopted throughout the proceedings for them to come out at the last moment on one side or the other. `Their own efforts to provide a solution of the Palestine question over the last twenty-eight years have failed owing to the apparently irreconcilable attitudes of the two peoples concerned. Having referred the matter to the United Nations, H.M.G. did not feel that it would be at all appropriate for them to intervene there for or against any particular solution on which the United Nations might wish to decide.

2. H.M.G. are confident that the Syrian Government/

Government will not allow the inability of

H.M.G. to meet their wishes on this point to affect the friendly relations between the two Governments any more than H.M.G. bear any lasting grudge against the Syrian Government in respect of the latter's inability to meet our point of view over the attitude of the Syrian representative at United Nations on the Egyptian question.

THING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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Registry No. Ell262/951/31

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TORON

Draft. telegram to

Telegram.

No....

(*Date*).....

Repeat/to:

U.K. Delegation, New York, and Arab Posts

CROSagree 22.3-Beins Dec.2

Exchic Culex Cypher.

Distribution:—
Cabinet.

Copies to:-

IMPORTANT CONFIDENTIAL

No.

F. O.,

December, 1947.

Despatched

M.

Addressed to Damascus, Telegram

of the , repeated

for information saving to Cairo, Bagdad, Jedda, Amman, Beirlut and U.K. Delegation New York.

Your Telegrams No. 529 and 531 of November 28th and 29th: Palestine.

Syrian President's message was immediat

passed to the Dominion Governments. It was also carefully considered here.

Palestine been guided by a policy of furnishing the Assembly with any information or advice required, but of abstaining from canvassing any particular solution. This policy is based on the fact that H.M.G. have, for 25 years, worked for the welfare of Palestine and have made many attempts to secure a settlement regarding the country's future acceptable to both Arabs and Jews, without success on this last issue. They therefore thought it right to confine their intervention in the Assembly proceedings to the limits described above and have consistently abstained from voting.

3. An essential corollary of this policy has been that members of the U.K. Delegation at New York have refrained from lowing in favour of one side or the other, and I therefore much regret that it would not in any case have been possible for us to agree to act as suggested by the Syrian Government. As it was, the two

appeals/

Reference:--

618

90

OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE,

appeals which you have reported came too late for any action on our part to have had a decisive effect.

You should reply on these were ages when President and P. M.

5. You should also intoring President that his message was immediately passed to Dominion Crots.

THING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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1 2 3 4 5 6 Reference:- F.O. 371 / 61890

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

Cypher/OTP

CABINET DISTRIBUTION 11262

FROM DAMASCUS TO FOREIGN OFFICE

DEC

Mr. Dundas No. 531

D.12.45 p.m. 29th November, 1947 29th November, 1947 R. 1.00 p.m. 29th November, 1947

Repeated to Beirut; United Kingdom Delegation New York; and to Arab Posts Saving.

MOST IMMEDIATE

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 531, repeated Beirut, United Kingdom Delegation New York and to Arab Posts Saving.

Syrian President sent for me this morning and spoke with considerable emotion about yesterday's United Nations debate. He asked me to send to the King, the Prime Minister and to you a personal message from him to the effect that at this historic moment when the fate of the Middle East hung in the balance he asked Great Britain to use her influence to prevent a United Nations decision for the partition of Palestine, which would inevitably have the profoundest and most disastrous effect on not only the Middle East but also on the British Commonwealth and indeed on the whole world. He requested that this personal message from him should be passed to Governments of the Dominions since Syria had no representatives who could do so. He was unable to forecast what would happen if partition was approved and felt the only step he could take to avert tragedy was to make this personal last minute appeal to his friends.

Foreign Office please pass to United Kingdom Delegation New York as my telegram No.15 Most Immediate.

[Repeated Most Immediate to United Kingdom Delegation New York].

k k k



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Under-Secretary of States of Commonwealth Relations.

IDEC 1947 Par Cont

This is an unparaphrased version of a Secret cypher (typex) message and the text must first be paraphrased if it is essential to communicate it to persons outside British and United States Government Services.

Outward Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office

CYPHER (TYPEX)

O.D.

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1 CANADA 2 AUSTRALIA

3 NEW ZEALAND

4 SOUTH AFRICA

5 INDIA

6 PAKISTAN

(GOVT)
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(Sent (1-4) 9.45 p.m. 29th Nov., 1947) (Sent (5-6) 10 p.m. 29th Nov., 1947)

IMMEDIATE


D No.934 SECRET (to 1-4) New Delhi No.14448 SECRET Karachi No.14449 SECRET

Palestine.

H.M. Minister Damascus reports that Syrian President sent for him on morning of 29th November and spoke with considerable emotion about United Nations debate on 28th November. He asked him to send to King, Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary a personal message from him to effect that at this historic moment when fate of Middle East hung in balance he asked Great Britain to use her influence to prevent a United Nations decision for partition of Palestine, which would inevitably have profoundest and most disastrous effect on not only Middle East but also on whole British Commonwealth and indeed on whole world. He requested that this personal message from him should be passed to Governments of Dominions since Syria had no representatives who could do so. He was unable to forecast what would happen if partition was approved and felt that only step he could take to avert tragedy was to make this personal last minute appeal to his friends.

Copy to:

Foreign Office Mr. B.A.B. Burrows.



Registry

GIANT

Addressed to U.K. Delegation, New York, No. 4203 of December 4. to Washington, Cairo, Bagdad, Jedda, Amman, Damas rus, Beirut, and Jerusalem, BME o Cauro Washington 125 H3 [Aag H] My telegram No. 4174 [of 2m Dec Palestine].

> Cabinet have now endorsed plan of withdrawal set out in my telegram No. 4126. As soon as United Nations commission is established, you should therefore inform them that there are a number of important matters on which you have been instructed to negotiate with them before they decide on their plans for moving to Palestine. matters will fall under three main heads:-

- (a) Arrangements for the Commission's arrival in Palestine in relation to the phases of our withdrawal plan;
- (b) The suggestion that we should evacuate a Jewish area, including a port, by February 1st;
- (c) Other matters connected with the hand-over of authority, including particularly financial and economic questions and the custody and evacuation of stores which we shall have been unable to evacuate before our final departure.

2./

2. On (a), you should inform the Commission in confidence of the outline of our plan as set out in my telegram No. 4126. You should emphasise the point which has already been made in your statements in committee that it would be intolerable for the Commission to begin to exercise its, authority while the Palestine Government was still administratively responsible H.M.G. therefore earnestly hope for Palestine. that the Commission will be willing to postpone its arrival in Palestine until May 1st, which will allow for a fortnight for handing over by the Palestine Government to the Commission before the authority of the former is terminated. Subsequent to that date, the Commission will be free so far as we are concerned to exercise its authority throughout Palestine, except that in the restricted area in which British troops will between that date and August 1st be concentrated the British military commander will have to exercise such authority as is necessary for the protection and rapid evacuation of British troops and military stores.

falling in with this timetable, you should add that, as they must frankly recognise, their arrival and assumption of authority in Palestine are bound to lead to a state of tension, if nothing worse, and that any such disorders would not only involve us, owing to our responsibility to maintain law and order while our administration continues, in action tantamount to the enforcement of partition, which we are unwilling to undertake, but would also seriously/

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

seriously/interfere with our withdrawal. This would not be in the interests of rapid and orderly hand-over to the Commission and we feel that it is in their interests, as well as in ours, that this situation should not arise.

4. If you are pressed still further. you could suggest as a final concession that, subject to conditions in Palestine at the time, there might not be quite the same difficulty about the arrival shortly before May 1st of part of the Commission's secretariat, who could begin to make arrangements for the Commission's accommodation etc. The timetable which we propose will clearly involve a modification of paragraph (4) of the recommendations to the effect that, if provisional councils of government cannot be set up by April 1st, the Commission should report back to the Security Council. We leave it to your discretion whether to call attention to this point at the outset or to leave it to arise in the course of discussion.

6. 5. We are not yet in a position to send you detailed instructions with regard to (b) and (c) in paragraph 1 above, but will do so shortly. You should however make the general point about the custody and evacuation of stores at an early stage.

7. 3. For your own information, a general outline of our plans is being conveyed immediately and in confidence to the Arab Governments/

of by the History Palestine to the Arab Higher Committee of to the Teurish Agency Governments. It will also be necessary to give a general outline of our intentions in the course of a debate in the House of Commons on Palestine on December 11th and 12th, though & berhafe without mentioning exact dates. Colonial Secretary stated in the House of Commons on December 3rd in reply to questions that "while the British administration is "functioning in Palestine for some months ahead, "the British Government must remain responsible "for law and order". While, therefore, it is or will shortly be, generally known that we intend to retain administrative responsibility for some time, it is desirable that, at least pending the conclusion of your discussions, the exact programme should remain confidential. 8 [bairo only 7 Please pars to BMEO.
as my til. 886.

130

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

Secret

Cypher/OTP

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO NEW YORK (To United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 4203 4th December, 1947

D.12.10 a.m. 5th December, 1947

Repeated to Washington No.12543; Cairo No.2210;
Bagdad No.1124; Jedda No.501; Amman No.537;
Damascus No.606; Beirut No.746; Jerusalem;
British Middle East Office Cairo No.856.

IMMEDIATE

SECRET

GIANT

Addressed to United Kingdom Delegation. New York;
No. 4205 of December 4th. Repeated for information to
Washington, Cairo, Bagdad, Jedda, Amman, Damascus, Beirut,
Jerusalem, B.M.E.O. Cairo.

My telegram No. 4174 [of 2nd December - Palestine].

Cabinet have now endorsed plan of withdrawal set out in my telegram No.4126. As soon as United Nations Commission is established, you should therefore inform it that there are a number of important matters on which you have been instructed to negotiate with it before it accides on its plans for moving to Palestine. These matters will fall under three main heads:-

- (a) Arrangements for the Commission's arrival in Palestine in relation to the phases of our withdrawal plan;
- (b) The suggestion that we should evacuate a Jewish area, including a port, by February 1st;
- (c) Other matters connected with the hand-over of authority, including particularly financial and economic questions and the custody and evacuation of stores which we shall have been unable to evacuate before our final departure.
- 2. On (a), you should inform the Commission in confidence of the outline of our plan as set out in my telegram No.4126. You should emphasise the point which has

already



already been made in your statements in committee that it would be intolerable for the Commission to begin to exercise its authority while the Palestine Government was still administratively responsible for Palestine. His Majesty's Government must therefore ask the Commission to postpone its arrival in Palestine until May 1st, which will allow for a fortnight for handing over by the Palestine Government to the Commission before the authority of the former is terminated. Subsequent to that date, the Commission will be free so far as we are concerned to exercise its authority throughout Palestine, except that in the restricted area in which British troops will be tween that date and August 1st be concentrated the British military commander will have to exercise such authority as is necessary for the protection and rapid evacuation of British troops and military stores.

- 5. If the Commission makes difficulties about falling in with this time-table, you should add that, as it must frankly recognise, its arrival and assumption of authority in Palestine are bound to lead to a state of tension, if nothing worse, and that any such disorders would not only involve us, owing to our responsibility to maintain law and order while our administration continues, in action tantamount to the enforcement of partition, which we are unwilling to undertake, but would also seriously interfer with our withdrawal. This would not be in the interests of rapid and orderly hand-over to the Commission and we feel that it is in its interests, as well as in ours, that this situation should not arise.
- 4. If you are pressed still further, you could suggest as a final concession that, subject to conditions in Palestine at the time, there might not be quite the same difficulty about the arrival shortly before May 1st of part of the Commission's secretariat, who could begin to make arrangements for the Commission's accommodation etc.
- 5. The time-table which we propose will clearly involve a modification of paragraph B (4) of the recommendations to the effect that, if provisional councils of government cannot be set up by April 1st, the Commission should report back to the Security Council. We leave it to your discretion whether to call attention to this point at the outset or to leave it to arise in the course of discussion.
- 6. We are not yet in a position to send you detailed instructions with regard to (b) and (c) in paragraph 1 above, but will do so shortly. You should however make the general point about the custody and evacuation of stores at an early stage.

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
7. For your own information, a general outline of our plans is being conveyed immediately and in confidence to the Arab Governments and by the High Commission for Palestine to the Arab Higher Committee and to the Jewish Agency. will also be necessary to give a general outline of our intentions in the course of a debate in the House of Commons on Palestine on December 11th and 12th, though perhaps without mentioning exact dates. The Colonial Secretary stated in the House of Commons on December 3rd in reply to questions that "while the British administration is functioning in Palestine for some months ahead, the British Government must remain responsible for law and order". While, therefore, it is, or will shortly be, generally known that we intend to retain administrative responsibility for some time, it is desirable that, at least pending the conclusion of your discussions, the exact programme should remain confidential.

8. [Caire enly]. Please pass to British Middle East Office as my telegram No. 856.

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| 1 2 3 4 5 6 | Reference:- FO 371 / 61890



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Secret.

BABB

No.

IMMEDIATE Despected Despected SECRET |
SECRET |
GIANT

Léno 22/14 December, 1947.

Addressed to Cairo Bagdad Jedda Damascu

Addressed to Cairo, Bagdad, Jedda, Damascus, Beirout, Amman, repeated for information to U.K.Delegation Department New York, Max Washington, Jerusalem, British Middle East Office, Adm.

My Telegram No. 4 2 3 to U.K. Delegation, New York of December 4 Palestine

You should inform the Government to which you are accredited that H.M.G. have now been able to take their planning on withdrawal from Palestine a stage further and that they feel it would be consistent with their friendly relations with Arab States and with their desire for smooth and orderly withdrawal from Palestine for them to take the earliest opportunity of telling the Governments of Arab States in confidence theoutline of their plans in so far as these have at present been approved.

being drawn up on the basis of withdrawal taking place as specdily as possible. The time limit that evacuation should be complete by August 1st. This will involve leaving behind a conciderable quantity of stores. It is clear, therefore, that any more rapid withdraw. would be out of the question. We hope incidentally to be able to arrange with successor authorities for the custody of subsequent evacuation of such stores as we are not able to take with us.

out within this framework, it is necessary from purely military and administrative grounds that the Palestine Government should retain administrative responsibility throughout Palestine for several months. H.L.G. have made

1 | Reference:-FO 371/61890

it

- 4. The general trend of British withdrawal will be from south to north. After the termination of the Civil Administration British troops will be concentrated in a limited area pending final evacuation through Haifa. Within that area the British Military Commander will continue to take such measures as are necessary for the protection and speedy evacuation of British troops and stores.
- Government to which you are accredited, you should emphasise that now that H.M.G. have with great frankness given them advance information of the outline of their withdrawal plans they feel justified in asking in turn that the Arab States should not do anything or permit anyone in their territory to do anything calculated to interfere with our orderly withdrawal or to oblige us while we are still in control to take measures to suppress disturbances in Palestine.
- 6. If you are pressed to discuss the status of the United Nations Commission and the timing of its arrival in Palestine and assumption of authority, you should say Sir A. Cadogan has

been/

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

been instructed to negotiate with the Commission in New York in the hope of ensuring that its arrangements fit in with ours.

arrangements fit in with ours.

7 Leavo only 7 Plane pass & BMEO.

25 my tel 857

Sect

1 2 3 4 5 6 Reference:- COPYRIGHT OF THE PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

[This telegram is of particular secrety and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on] Secret

Cypher/OTP

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO:

CAIRO	No.	2211
BAGDAD	No.	1125
JEDDA	No.	502
DAMASCUS	No.	307
BEIRUT	No.	747
AMMAN	No.	538

4th December, 1947.

D. 12.50 p.m. 5th December, 1947

Repeated to U.K. Del. New York No. 4204

Washington No. 12544
Jerusalem
B.M.E.O. Cairo No. 857

IMMEDIATE SECRET GIANT

Addressed to Cairo, telegram No. 2211 of 4th December, Bagdad, Jedda, Damascus, Beirut and Amman, repeated for information to Washington, Jerusalem, British Middle East Office, Aden and United Kingdom Delegation New York.

My telegram No. 4203 to United Kingdom Delegation, New York [of December 4th: Palestine].

You should inform the Government to which you are accredited that His Majesty's Government have now been able to take their planning on withdrawal from Palestine a stage further and that they feel it would be consistent with their friendly relations with Arab States and with their desire for smooth and orderly withdrawal from Palestine for them to take the earliest opportunity of telling the Governments of Arab States in confidence the outline of their plans insofar as these have at present been approved.


- 2. You should emphasise that the plans are being drawn up on the basis of withdrawal taking place as speedily as possible. The time limit is that evacuation should be complete by August 1st. This will involve leaving behind a considerable quantity of stores. It is clear, therefore, that any more rapid withdrawal would be out of the question. We hope incidentally to be able to arrange with successor authorities for the custody of subsequent evacuation of such stores as we are not able to take with us.
- 3. In order that withdrawal may be carried out within this framework, it is necessary on purely military and administrative grounds that the Palestine Government should retain administrative responsibility throughout Palestine for several months. His Majesty's Government have made it clear that during this period they will not allow their forces or administration to be used in enforcing a settlement which is not acceptable to both Jews and Arabs. They would naturally have much preferred to terminate their responsibility at an earlier date, but for purely practical

/reasons are

reasons are unable to do so. The exact date prior to completion of evacuation on which the mandate will be relinquished and the British Administration brought to an end will be communicated to the Arab Governments as soon as possible.

- 4. The general trend of British withdrawal will be from south to morth. After the termination of the Civil Administration British troops will be concentrated in a limited area pending final evacuation through Haifa. Within that area the British Military Commander will continue to take such measures as are necessary for the protection and speedy evacuation of British troops and stores.
- 5. In making this communication to the Government to which you are accredited, you should emphasise that now that His Majesty's Government have with great frankness given them advance information of the outline of their withdrawal plans, they feel justified in asking in turn that the Arab States should not do anything or permit anyone in their territory to do anything calculated to interfere with our orderly withdrawal or to oblige us while we are still in control to take measures to suppress disturbances in Palestine.
- 6. If you are pressed to discuss the status of the United Nations Commission and the timing of its arrival in Palestine and assumption of authority, you should say Sir A. Cadogan has been instructed to negotiate with the Commission in New York in the hope of ensuring that its arrangements fit in with ours.
- 7. [To Cairo only.] Please pass to British Middle East Office as my telegram No. 857.

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1 2 3 4 5 6 Reference:- F.O.

371 / 61890

from communication to be addressed to good. to which you are acciedited. 2. Please refort whether, in jour opinion, this communication mill now satisfy fort. to which you are accudited or wlethen you ensider it frefædle to adopt allemative proposed by High bommisnioner in his telegram Llaris only Please pass to BMEO [Seul on Mr. Burrows' instructions

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

(E)

(Secret)

Cypher/OTP

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO No. 2222.

BAGDAD No. 1137, JEDDA No. 510, DAMASCUS No. 614, BEIRUT No. 755, AMMAN No. 545.

6th December, 1947. D. 5.25 p.m. 6th December, 1947.

Repeated to United Kingdom Delegation New York No. 4228, Washington No. 12640, Jerusalem (Most Immediate),

B.M.E.O. Cairo No. 863.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

SECRET.

GIANT.

Addressed Cairo telegram No. 2222. December 6th, Bagdad, Jedda, Damascus, Beirut, Amman and repeated for information to Jerusalem, United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations New York, Washington, B.M.E.O. Cairo and Aden.

My telegram No. 2211 to Cairo and Palestine telegram No. 2346 [of 4th and 6th December: communication to Arab Governments about withdrawal from Palestine].

For the time being please omit first sentence of paragraph 4 of my telegram under reference from communication to be addressed to Government to which you are accredited.

2. Please report whether, in your opinion, this communication will now satisfy Government to which you are accredited or whether you consider it preferable to adopt alternative proposed by High Commissioner in his telegram under reference.

[Caire only] Please pass to B.M.E.O. as my telegram Ne. 863.

[Sent on Mr. Burrows' instructions].

1 2 3 4 5 6 Reference:- F. S. 6 Reference:- F.

OUTWARD TELEGRAM

TELEGRAM

//262 957 ?!

75872/159/47

Cypher (O.T.P.)

TO PALESTINE (General Sir A. Cunningham) FROM S. OF S. COLONIES.

Sent 5th December, 1947, 19.30 hrs.

MOST IMMEDIATE

No. 3151 Top Secret.

My telegrams Nos., 3138 and 3141 repeating to you Foreign Office telegrams No. 4203 to UKDEL New York and No. 2211 to Cairo respectively.

Please now make parallel communication to representatives of Jews and Palestinian Arabs on the lines indicated in my telegrem No. 5141, subject of course to any necessary variations at your discretion to suit local circumstances.

Distributed to:-/

Distributed to:-

R. 243 Secretary of State Sir T. Lloyd Mr. Rees-Williams Sir S. Caine Sir C. Jeffries Mr. Holding Mr. Martin Mr. Trafford Smith Mr. Gutch Mr. Mathieson Mr. Highem Mr. Galsworthy Mr. Holmer Mr. Gibson Mr. Dale Cabinet Offices Ministry of Defence Treasury Admiral ty

Ministry of Transport
Air Ministry
Foreign Office

•

M. I. 5.

War Office

Mr. S.E.V. Luke.

Brig. Cornwall-Jones.

Commender Evershed.

Mr. A.J. Newling.

Mr. D.F.C. Rlunt.

Mr. W. Russell-Edmunds.

Mr. P.N.M. Synnott.

Captain Maunsell.

Capt. D. H. Hall-Thompson.

Mr. G.C.B. Dodds.

Brig. J.R.C. Hamilton.

Brig. L.L. Wansbrough-Jones

Lt. Col. M.M. Charteris.

Mr. B.F. Picknett.

Mr. F.C. Rennie.

Air Commodore Brook.

Group Capt. V.H.B. Roth.

Mr. B.A.B. Burrows.

Mr. P. Garran.

Mr. J.G.S. Beith.

Mr. J.G.S. Beith.

With the Compliments of the Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations.

5 DEG 1947

Any telegraphic retransmission of this secret cypher (publex) telegram must be prepared in a one-time system.

Outward Telegram from Commonwealth Relations Office

F.2781 CYPHER (PUBLEX)

TO:

CANADA AUSTRALIA

(GOVT.)

NEW ZEALAND

SOUTH AFRICA

(Sent 11.55 p.m. 4th Dec., 1947.)

D. No.,949 SECRET.

ARAB STATES AND PALESTINE.


His Majesty's Representatives in Arab States have been instructed to inform Government to which they are accredited that we are urgently studying position created by United Nations decision on partition of Palestine and that we will keep Arab Governments informed of such further developments as will affect their interests. In meanwhile we feel certain that Arab Governments for their part will not take any action which might complicate our withdrawal from Palestine and handover to United Nations Commission, and that Arab Governments will therefore proceed with circumspection and will do nothing precipitate during transitional period. Whatever may be feelings of Arab Governments with regard to United Nations decision we are counting on assurances which Arab spokesmen have given that there is no intention of causing trouble in Palestine while we are still in control there, and while we are bound to repress disorder there from whatever quarter it arises.

Representatives are also to say that it will not be enough for Arab States to refrain from sending units of their armies into Palestine but we must also urge them (particularly in case of Syria and Lebanon) to restrain any of their nationals who may try to make their way into Palestine for purposes of causing disorder there, as well as organisations and individuals in their territories who try to incite disorder from outside.

Foreign Office Copy to:-

Mr. I.A. Kirkpatrick Mr. J.P.G. Finch (4)

Mr. J.G.S. Beith



Copies to:—

Registry

Secret. Confidential. Restricted.

No.

December Addressed to Cairo No. 2243, Bagdad , Beirut No. . Damascus

, Amman 📂 and Jedda 🚻 Rpeated to U.K. Delegation, New York, Washington and Jerusalem.

My telegram No. 2211 to Cairo of 4th December: Palestine /.

Colonial Secretary, who will probably speak first in the House of Commons debate on Palestine, on December 11th and 12th, will announce that Sir A. Cadogan has been sent instructions to inform the United Nations Commission of H.M.G.'s outline plan for withdrawal and to express the hope that they will see their way to make their arrangements conform to this plan. Mr. Creech Jones will go on to say that the date on which it is proposed that the mandate should be terminated is May 15th, 1948 and that it will be impossible for us to allow the Commission to arrive in Palestine until shortly before the termination of the mandate.

2. You should inform the Government to which you are accredited on December 11th that this statement will be made in London on that day.

3. Mr. Creech Jones' statement will also probably contain references to the proposal in the United Nations recommendations that a

Jewish/

Jewish seaport should be evacuated at a very early stage, and to immigration. Both these points to be discussed by Ministers on the morning of December 11th and it will not be possible to send you instructions to include these points in your communication/to the Government to which you are accredited until the afternoon of that day. I leave it to your discretion whether to make a separate communication on the lines of paragraph I above, and a further communication when you receive further instructions on the other two points, or whether you should not make any communication until you can include references to these two

4. In view of enquiry in para. 6

g Bagdard tel. No 1267 you should

f you think desirable inform

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

Cypher/OTP.

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO

No. 2243.

Secret.

D. 7.55 p.m. 10th December, 1947.

10th December, 1947.
AND TO: Bagdad No. 1155, Beirut No. 767, Damascus No. 624,
Amman No. 556, Jedda No. 517.

Repeated to New York (U.K.Delegation) No. 4264 Washington No. 12805 Jerusalem.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

SECRET.

Addressed to Cairo No. 2243 of December 10th,
Bagdad, Beirut, Damascus, Amman and Jedda. Repeated to
United Kingdom Delegation New York, Washington, and
Jerusalem.

My telegram No. 2211 to Cairo [of 4th December: Palestine].

Colonial Secretary, who will probably speak first in the House of Commons debate on Palestine on December 11th and 12th, will announce that Sir A. Cadogam has been sent instructions to inform the United Nations Commission of His Majesty's Government's outline plan for withdrawal and to express the hope that they will see their way to make their arrangements conform to this plan. Mr. Creech Jones will go on to say that the date on which it is proposed that the mandate should be terminated is May 15th, 1948 and that it will be impossible for us to allow the Commission to arrive in Palestine until shortly before the termination of the mandate.

- 2. You should inform the Government to which you are accredited on December 11th that this statement will be made in London on that day.
- 3. Mr. Creech Jones' statement will also probably contain references to the proposal in the United Nations recommendations that a Jewish scaport should be evacuated at a very early stage, and to immigration. Both these points are to be discussed by Ministers on the morning of December 11th and it will not be possible to send you instructions to make a communication on these points to the Government to which you are accredited until the afternoon of that day. I leave it to your discretion whether to make a separate communication on the lines of paragraph 1 above, and a further communication when you receive further instructions on the other two points. Or whether you should not make any communication until you can include references to these two points as well
- 4. In view of enquiry in paragraph 6 of Bagdad telegram No. 1267 you should if you think desirable inform Government to which you are accredited that British forces intend in the course of their withdrawal to abandon no (repeat no) weapons, ammunition or warlike stores in Palestine.

Draft. Cairo MOST IMMEDIATE Bagdad Beirut CONFIDENTIAL Damascus GIANT. Amman ______560 ~ Jedda 5/9 Telegram. Addressed to Cairo No. 2248, of Deell , Beirut No-Bagdad No. Dated. Dec/ Damascus -No-Repeated to and Jedda No. U.K. Delegation, New York, Washington Repeat to and Jerusalem. My telegram No. 2243 to Cairo Washington 12844 fof December 10th : Palestine, Jerusalen paragraph 3. The Colonial Secretary's speech will include statement that question Cypher of evacuation of a Jewish seaport NOTH World Organisation presents difficulty and must be studied with the United Nations Commission

B. A. B. B.

6189

immigration. As regards immigration, he will say that the Jews and other Powers must realise the necessity for the continuance of control while we

because it touches on the question of

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retain the mandate. It is essential that, during this period, nothing is done to inflame feelings on either side. Reference will also be made to the necessity of clearing the camps in Cyprus.

2. You have discretion to inform Government to which you are accredited of the above. if you think it desirable:

HARS

11.12

THING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

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OUT FILE

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

Cypher/OTP

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO

No. 2248
11th December, 1947.

D. 5.18 p.m. 11th December, 1947.

And addressed to Bagdad No. 1158
Beirut No. 770
Damascus No. 627
Amman No. 560
Jedda No. 519

Repeated to New York No. 4275
Washington No. 12844
Herusalem

MOST IMMEDIATE
CONTIDENTAL
GIANT

Addressed to Caire No. 2248 of December 11th, Bagdad Beirut, Damascus, Amman and Jedda. Repeated for information to U.K. Delegation New York, Washington and Jerusalem.

My telegram Ne. 2245 to Cairo [of December 10th: Palestine] paragraph 3.

The Colonial Secretary's speech will include statement that question of evacuation of a Jewish scapert presents difficulty and must be studied with the United Nations Commission because it touches on the question of immigration. As regards immigration, he will say that the Jews and other Powers must realise the necessity for the continuance of control while we retain the mandate. It is essential that, during this period, nothing is done to inflame feelings on either side. Reference will also be made to the necessity of clearing the camps in Cyprus.

2. You may inform Government to which you are accredited of the above.

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@ 8 1/262/957/31 OUT FILE

Top Secret Cypher/OTP

DIPLOMATIC (SECRET)

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO CAIRO

No. 2270

15th December, 1947

D. 4.00 p.m. 15th December, 1947

and to Bagdad No. 1177
Damascus No. 634
Beirut No. 777
Jedda No. 527
Amman No. 568
B.M.E.O. No. 894

Repeated to Washington No. 12998 United Kingdom Delegation New York No. 4300

TOP SECRET

Addressed to Cairo No. 2270 December 15th and to Bagdad, Damascus, Beirut, Jedda, Amman, B.M.E.O. Repeated for information to Washington and United Kingdom Delegation New York.

Palestine.

I do not want to lose sight of the possibility that His Majesty's Government may sooner or later have an opportunity to use their good offices in breaching the wide gulf which still unhappily separates the Jews and the Arabs. When I saw Nuri Pasha on December 11th he said that in his view conciliation at some stage was the best hope and I tried to leave the way open for this in my speech in the House of Commons on December 12th. In spite of their present threatening statements it is possible that some at least among the Arabs are uneasy at the thought of defying the rest of the world, and if an opportunity for conciliation arises they might consider His Majesty's Government to be in the best position to assist. It would be to our advantage if we could still help to promote agreement.

2. You should therefore watch carefully for, and repeat to me at once, any signs that might point to a willingness on the Arab side to consider a development of this nature, whether among political leaders or among others. You should not, repeat not, put forward any specific suggestion on the above lines without reference to me but you may take any opportunity of implanting or encouraging the idea that conciliation would afford the best way out of the present dangerous and explosive situation.

[Cairo only] Please pass to B.M.E.O. as my telegram No. 894.

888

With the Compliments of the Under-Secresary of State for Commonwealth Relations.

(GOVT.)

150.

This is an unparaphrased version of a Secret cypher (typex) message and the text must first be paraphrased if it essential to communicate it to persons outside British and United States Government Services.

OUTWARD TELEGRAM FROM COMMONWEALTH RELATIONS OFFICE

CYPHER (TYPEX)

R.D.

TO: 1. CANADA 2. AUSTRÁLIA 3. NÉW ZEALAND

SOUTH AFRICA

5. INDIA 6. PAKISTAN

(1 - 4) (Sent 9.30 p.m. 10th Dec., 1947) (5 & 6) (Sent 9.55 p.m. 10th Dec., 1947)

D. No. 965 SECRET India No. 14575 SECRET Pakistan No. 14576 SECRET

My telegram 7th December D. No. 955.

My telegram 7th December India No. 14539. (to

(to 6) My telegram 7th December Pakistan No. 14540.

PALESTINE.

His Majesty's Representatives in Arab States have been instructed to make it clear to Governments to which they are accredited that statement that general trend of British withdrawal in Palestine will be from south to north refers only to military withdrawal (my telegram under reference paragraphs 5 and 7). end of mandate Palestine Government will remain administratively responsible throughout Palestine, irrespective of whether or not military forces have been withdrawn from any particular area.

Copy to:-

Foreign Office

Mr. I.A. Kirkpatrick Mr. J.P.G. Finch (4)

Colonial Office

Mr. B.A.B. Burrows Mr. Trafford Smith

INWARD TELEGRAM

15

11262 951/71

Cypher (O.T.P.)

FROM PALESTINE (General Sir A. Cumningham)

TO S. OF S., COLONIES.

D. 8th December, 1947. R. 8th " 22.55 hrs.

MOST IMEDIATE

No. 2365 Top Secret and Personal.

Addressed S. of S.
Repeated U.K. Delegation (Weshington please pass as my telegrom Wo.1706).

Baghdad No. 90.
Beirut No.1707.
Damascus No.1708.
Jedda No. 96.
Cairo No. 153.
Aden No.1709.
Annan by savingram No.820.

I saw Ben Gurion and Khalidi yesterday and referred to them your telegram No.3151. Both asked questions as to the arrival of the Commission to which I replied that I was without information. Both referred to the question of free port and the importation of arms and as I have already stated, latter is clearly crucial issue to them. I could not, of course, at present give either assurance to one or reassurance to the other. Dr. Khalidi said that we should know that it was the firm intention of the Arab Higher Committee not to nurse the U.N.O. Commission in any way. He also asked number of questions regarding details of evacuation which were also premature at present.

2. I took the opportunity of expressing, particularly to the Jews, my views on the behaviour of both communities during recent disturbances.

Distributed to:-/

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1 2 3 4 5 6 Reference:- 6 Reference:- 6 371 / 6189

Distributed to:-

M.I.5.

R. 243
Secretary of State als Leasnes) HMTTULIAG MONT Sir T. Lloyd Mr. Rees-Williams Sir S. Caine Sir C. Jeffries Mr. Holding TANK CHANGE AND Mr. Martin Mr. Trafford Smith Mr. Gutch Mr. Mathieson Mr. Higham Mr. Galsworthy Mr. Holmer Mr. Dale Cabinet Offices Ministry of Defence Treasury Admiralty War Office Ministry of Transport Air Ministry Foreign Office

Mr. S.E.V. Luke. Brigadier Cornwall-Jones. Commander Everahed, R.N. Mr. A.J. Newling. Mr. D.F.C. Blunt. Mr. W. Russell-Edmunds.
Mr. P.N.N. Synnott.
Captain Maunsell.
Captain D.H. Hall-Thompson.
Mr. G.C.B. Dodds. Brigadier J.R.C. Hamilton. Brigadier L.L. Wenabrough-Jone Lt. Col. M.M. Charteris. Mr. B.F. Ploknett. Mr. B.F. Plekhett.
Mr. F.C. Renuie.
Air Commodore Brook.
Group Captain V.H.B. Roth.
Mr. B.A.B. Burrows.
Mr. P. Garran.
Mr. J.G.S. Beith.
Mr. J.C. Robertson.

En Clair

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION.

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations)

No. 3566

D. 8.26 p.m. 29th Nevember 1947. R. 1.47 a.m. 30th Nevember 1947.

29th November 1947.

Repeated to Jerusalem

Washington 9

Washington Saving.

MOST LMMEDIATE.

l DEC

111263

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 3566 November 29th repeated for information to Jerusalem and Saving to Washington.

Palestine.

When the Assembly met in the afternoon of the 29th November Chamoun announced the readiness of the Arab Delegations to enter into discussions with the aim of establishing a federal state in Palestine.

- 2. Neither the Colombian nor any other neutral Delegate moved a further adjournment. This was done by Persia after the United States had called for an immediate vete on the report of the Ad Hoc Committee but in terms which the chairman declared to constitute more than a simple motion for adjournment. He consequently decided that the vote on the Committee's report should be taken first. The report was carried by 33 votes to 13 with 10 abstentions.
- 3. After the announcement of this result Sir A. Cadegan made the statement centained in my immediately following telegram.
- Abdullah then made statements to the effect that their Governments did not recognise the validity of the Assembly's decision and reserved their full freedom of action. The Arab Delegations then walked out. Pakistan also washed its hands of responsibility for the decision and announced that it would take no part in the election of the Five Power Commission for Palestine.
- 5. The Assembly approved without discussion the President's proposal that the Commission should be composed of representatives of Bolivia, Czecheslovakia, Denmark, Panama and the Philippines.

Foreign Office please pass Most Immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 252.

[Copy sent to Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem].

A A A

INWARD TELEGRAM

ner (v. T.P.) 1/265

FROM PALESTINE (General Sir A. Cunninghem)

TO S. OF S., COLONIES.

D. 2nd December, 1947. R. 2nd " 15.30 hrs.

MOST IMMEDIATE

No. 2307 Top Secret and Personal.

Addressed UKDEL No.1659.
Repeated S. of S. (S. of S. please pass to UKDEL New York).

I have been considering further the question of action of the U.N.O. Commission to be sent here to implement partition.

While knowing nothing about the others I have reason to welcome the choice of Lisicky, who made the most painstaking research of all the members of the U.N.O. Commission into conditions here and was consistently realistic and impartial in his approach to the problem. I have been therefore considering whether the fact that the Committee has at least one influential and unbiased member should cause us to modify the recommendation that there should be only a 15 day overlap between the enrival of the Commission and the cessation of civil government. I have rather reluctantly come to the conviction that we should adhere to this arrangement. Although Araba (?soom omitted) sincerely to desire to avoid trouble with us, yet it is doubtful whether they could hold their extreme factions when the Commission actually arrives. Emil Choury has in fact stated that action will start when Commission errives. The more fact that Lisicky voted for partition will be enough to put the Arabs against him. It would seem therefore that our initial co-operation

'

would have to be confined to suggestions I have made for administrative understudies to be sent out in advance of the Commission.

2. The Jewish Press carries statement that the Commission will set itself up in Tel Aviv. This may well be a canard, but Lisicky himself must realise that if they do this any faint chance there may have been of contact with Arabs will vanish, probably for good.

an international regime for Jerusalem early enough before we leave for it to have some stability. As against this, however, must be set off the possibility of Arab opposition, for international control of Jerusalem runs remiss to their demands, and if it is to be established under the aegis of the Partition Commission, may be well opposed by them for that reason. In whatever decision is taken I feel necessity for ensuring that safety of Jerusalem should be paramount.

4. I am sure that you'will appreciate that until the date for the termination of the mandate is announced our preparations cannot progress fully, and from our point of view the earlier this date is announced the better.

of military withdrawal should be kept secret. For instance, to make known fact that they had left or were leaving Gaza District would undoubtedly upset our plans. Their withdrawal will not be apparent as there is already little military activity there and the same applies to other areas. (Copies sent to Foreign Office for onward transmission). Distributed to

INWARD TELEGRAM

Distributed to:-

R. 243 Secretary of State Sir T. Lloyd Mr. Rees-Williams Sir S. Caine Sir C. Jeffries Mr. Holding Mr. Martin Mr. Trafford Smith Mr. Gutch Mr. Mathieson Mr. Higham Mr. Galawerthy Mr. Holmer Mr. Gibson Mr. Dale Cabinet Offices

Ministry of Defence Treasury

Admiralty

War Office

Ministry of Transport

Air Ministry

Foreign Office

M. I. 5.

- Mr. S. E. V. Luke.

Brig. Cornwell-Jones.

Commander Evershed.

Mr. A. J. Newling.

Mr. D. F. C. Blunt.

Mr. W. Russell-Edmunds.

Mr. P. N. N. Synnott.

Capt. Maunsell.

Capt. D. H. Hall-Thompson.

Mr. G. C. B. Dodds.

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Brig. L. L. Wansbrough-Jone.

Lt. Col. M. M. Charteris.

Mr. E. F. Picknett.

Mr. F. C. Remnie.

Air Commodore Brook.

Group Capt. V. H. B. Roth.

Mr. B. A. B. Burrows.

Mr. P. Garran.

Mr. J. G. S. Beith.

Mr. J. C. Robertson.

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OUTWARD TELEGRAM

158 HZ

11263 951 31.

5872/158/47

ypher (O.T.F.)

TO PALESTINE (General Sir A. Cunningham)

FROM S. OF S., COLONIES.

Sent 3rd December, 1947, 20.00 hrs.

IMMEDIATE

No. 3115 Top Secret and Personal. Morning.

Addressed High Commissioner Palestine. Repeated United Kingdom Delegation New York.

Your telegram No. 2307.

Negotiations with U.N.O. Commission.

If we are to adhere to date of 15th May for termination of Mandato it is now necessary to do all in our power to arrange that the Commission does not arrive in Palestine until we are ready to hand over to it, i.e. about May 1st. Sir A. Cadogan is as you are aware now entering on negotiations to this end which will also have to cover agreement on any modifications to plan recommended by General Assembly necessary to conform with our timetable.

Please telegraph as soon as possible a provisional agenda of the subjects for negotiation with U.N.O. from point of view of Palestine Government. In general it would seem useful from our point of view if a fair amount of time could be spent on this agenda in New York, thus postponing essential departure arrangements of Commission. If therefore there are other subjects which Cadogan could usefully broach with U.N.O. at this stage, please include these in your reply. Gibson will of course be available for consultation in New York from Sunday,

(Copies sent to Foreign Office for transmission to New York)

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Mr. S.E.V. Luke.

Brig. Cornwell-Jones.

Commander Evershed.

Mr. A.J. Newling.

Mr. D.F.C. Brunt.

Mr. W. Russell-Edmunds.

Mr. P.N.N. Synnottg47

Captain Maunsell.

Capt. D.H. Hall-Therpton.

Mr. G.C.B. Dodds.

Brig. J.R.C. Hamilton

Brig. L.L. Wansbrough Jones.

Lt.Col. N.M. Charter.

Mr. B.F. Picknett.

Mr. F.C. Rennie.

Air Commodore Brook.

Group Capt. V.H.B. Roth.

Mr. B.A.B. Burrows.

Mr. J.G.S. Belth.

Mr. J.G.S. Belth.

Mr. J.G.S. Robertson.

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on]

Cypher/OTP.

CABINET DISTRIBUTION

FROM JEDDA TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr. Trott.

D. 12.01 a.m. 29th November, 1947. R. 5.24 p.m. 29th November, 1947.

29th November, 1947.

Repeated to Damascus,
Beirut,
Amman,
Bagdad,
Cairo,

Bagdad,
Cairo,
British Middle East Office Cairo.

SECRET.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram 389 of November 29th, repeated to Damascus, Beirut, Amman, Bagdad, Cairo, British Middle East Office Cairo.

Your telegram 480.

Palestine.

I spoke to Azzam both at Riyadh and here and gave him reply to his question as instructed. He expressed thanks but said that he really meant to enquire what would be the position when His Majesty's Government's responsibility begins to come to an end. During the time responsibility begins to come to an end. During the time that we were responsible he hoped we should not only prevent all illegal immigration but see that legal immigrants should include a considerable proportion of old persons, women and children. And when our control old persons, women and children. And when our control came to an end Arabs hoped to find some way of stopping entry of crowds of young Jews who were being trained in camps in France, Algiers and elsewhere.

Syment

- 2. He said Ibn Saud had promised monetary help.
 The League hoped to collect a million pounds this year.
 As for [grp.undec. ? lean], this was one of his ideas
 arising out of a conversation he had had with Mr. Bevin
 arising out of a conversation he had had with Mr. Bevin
 about September 16th last. Azzam had then outlined a
 scheme for getting round the Egyptian deadlock by strengthenescheme for getting round the Egyptian deadlock by strengthenescheme for getting round the Egyptian deadlock by strengthenescheme cultural and other ties between Arab nations with
 ing cultural and other ties between Arab nations with
 object of enabling His Majesty's Government eventually
 - 3. Azzam proposed to leave for Egypt November 28th.

Foreign Office pass to Amman and Cairo to B. M. E. O. as my telegrams 59 and 50 respectively.

[Repeated to Amman].

| 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | Reference:-FO | 371 / 61890

WAY N

AMENDMENT SLIP.

CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

Jedda telegram No. 389 of 29th November to Foreign Office.

Paragraph 2, Line 5, for "[gp. undec.]" please read "support".


Communications Department.

4th December 1947



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EN CLAIR.

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION.

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations).

No. 3567.

D. 8.31 p.m. 29th November 1947.

29th November 1947. R. 1.48 a.m. 30th November 1947.

Repeated to: Jerusalem and Saving to

Washington.

MOST IMMEDIATE.

GIANT.

DEC

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram
No. 3567 of 29th November 1947, repeated to Jerusalem
and Saving to Washington.

My immediately preceding telegram.

Following is text:-

Now that the General Assembly has adopted this Resolution I must point out that there will be a number of points of detail connected with the application of the plan that will closely affect my Government. I have therefore been instructed to express the hope that the United Nations Commission will get into communication with His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in order that arrangements may be agreed for their arrival in Palestine and for the co-ordination of their plans with those of the Mandatory Power for the withdrawal of British Administration and British Military Forces.

Foreign Office please pass Most Immediate to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 253.

[Copy sent to Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem.]

W:W:W:W:W

[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on].

Cypher/OTP.

WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION.

FROM NEW YORK TO FOREIGN OFFICE.

(From United Kingdom Delegation to United Nations).

No. 3568.

D. 8.34 p.m. 29th November 1947.

29th November 1947. R. 1.50 a.m. 30th November 1947.

Repeated to: Jerusalem

and Saving to Washington.

DEC

IMMEDIATE.

GIANT.

SECRET.

Addressed to Foreign Office telegram No. 3568 of 29th November, repeated to Jerusalem and Saving to Washington.

My telegram No. 3566.

Palestine.

Bolivian Delegate has informed Hadow that he was not consulted about the election of Bolivia to the Palestine Commission. He hopes none the less to obtain the Bolivian Government's consent to appointment of a suitable representative, whose first care will be to assist the British officials in Palestine in their difficult task.


- 2. Same assurance has been received from Panamanian Delegate, who asked Hadow to keep in touch with him and with Dr. Alfaro (Minister for Foreign Affairs) in Washington next week.
- 3. Please telegraph to Washington any particular points you would wish Hadow to make to either of above Delegations.
- 4. We understand that Czech Representative will be Lisicky who was a member of UNSCOP and has also represented Czechoslovakia in discussions on Palestine at present Assembly. He has shown himself most friendly, realistic and helpful.

Fereign Office please pass to Jerusalem as my telegram No. 254.

[Advance copy sent to Telegraph Section, Colonial Office for repetition to Jerusalem.]

W:W:W:W:W

618



[This telegram is of particular secrecy and should be retained by the authorised recipient and not passed on] /68

Ö,

E11273/951/31

OUT FILE

Secret Cypher/OTP WORLD ORGANISATION DISTRIBUTION

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON

No. 12473

3rd December, 1947

D. 3.45 p.m. 3rd December, 1947

Repeated to Jerusalem, United Kingdom Delegation, New York No. 4187.

IMPORTANT

GIANT

SECRET

Addressed to Washington telegram No. 12475 of 3rd December. Repeated for information to United Kingdom Delegation New York and Jerusalem.

New York telegram No. 3568 [of November 29th: Palestine].

Our objectives are set out in my telegram No. 4125 to New York and I hope that Mr. Hadow will be able to impress upon the Bolivian and Panamanian representatives the importance of discussing with Sir A. Cadogan how best to co-ordinate the Commission's plans with our plan for withdrawal and of avoiding any precipitate departure for Palestine.

2. We feel that it is in the interests of the Commission themselves that they should be given time to make proper arrangements regarding their powers, terms of reference, etc. before proceeding to Palestine and that, if they do not do so, they will only find themselves on arrival the target for every kind of local pressure without the machinery for carrying out what they will be asked to do. Me have made it clear that our policy is entirely directed towards withdrawal and that we cannot implement a plan which is not agreed between Jews and Arabs.

3. The first step to be taken by the new Commission would seem to be to clear up with the United Nations the means to be furnished for carrying out their task.

888

END 70

Cyphe**r/**OTP

DEPART ENPAL No. 2

FROM MANILA TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Mr Foulds
D. 9. 57 a.m. 28th November, 1947.

No. 244

28th November, 1947.

R. 4. 30 a.m. 29th November, 1947.

CONFIDENTIAL

Minister for Foreign Affairs questioned me this morning about British attitude towards partition of Palestine. I replied briefly on lines indicated in your telegram No. 49 Intel.

- 2 His Excellency then said that Philippine delegate to United Nations had been instructed to vote against partition if his adverse vote would prevent the decisive accustomed two-thirds majority in favour of partition: etherwise he was to abstain from voting altogether. Philippine Government did not believe in partition, they favoured a federal system on the Swiss model.
- 3. I find it difficult to believe Philippine Government have any genuine concern with Palestine. They certainly have no conception of the complexity and intractability. of the problem. They may be prompted by a desire to enjoy the limelight in an issue which does not affect their interests.

2 2 2